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THE 'TAKING' OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Right to Use Private Property Is One of America's Basic Foundations, But the Bogus Cries of
'Takings' Protesters Mask an Intense Attack on Laws That Advance Public Good
Copyright 1994 Roll Call Associates
Roll Call
July 25, 1994
Rep. Bruce Vento
A neighbor is unhappy because he can't burn
toxic substances in his backyard. Another neighbor
is displeased because she can't dump raw sewage
into the creek that divides your properties. And
while you may be happy that the laws and rules
protect your family's health and safety (not to
mention your property's value), your neighbors join
the "TAKING!" chorus, demanding payment to obey
environmental laws.
The right to own and use private property is
one of the basic foundations of America, recognized
by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which
requires compensation when private property is taken
for public purposes. This American value runs deep
in our nation: Our vast expanse of land allowed
immigrants to stake out personal property as a
bulwark safeguarding personal freedom.
Everyone is for the protection of private
property rights. So, what is prompting all the heated
rhetoric? What is behind the debate of the new
"taking" battle cry? Why are some seeking a new
definition of a "taking" requiring compensation?
In all too many cases, the cries of "defend
private property" or the charges about "takings" are
being employed to mask an intense attack on laws
that advance the public good.
Such anti-public welfare aggressors, hiding
behind a "takings" heat shield, are advancing a
bogus claim that private property rights are under
attack and are calling for a counterattack against
public interest regulations that they label "takings."
The aggressors invoke anecdotes to challenge 205
years of sound private property protection under the
Constitution. The changes advocated would do far
more than just "defend" property rights.
Some of the stories, such as the tale about
the kangaroo rat's alleged role in the destruction of
29 homes in the 1993 California wildfire, are hyped
distortions of the event. The General Accounting
Office reports that "the loss of homes during the
California fire was not related to the prohibition of
disking in areas inhabited" by the kangaroo rat.
This cooked-up attack is an all-out offensive
against the very American legal system that enables
citizens to protect themselves and that which they
value.
On the other hand, we have a sad
encyclopedia of undeniably true stories about people
not allowed to eat fish or shellfish, let alone swim in
certain bodies of water. There are also mercury
pollution, cadmium in the soils, abandoned mine
sites, polluted wildlife refuges, and many similar
examples of the price the public has been and will
continue to pay because of inadequately regulated
actions of certain individuals and groups.
Americans expect their government to
protect and defend their health and safety. We
believe that no individual has the right to
contaminate the water, air, and soil, the common
estate shared by all, and we value our natural and
cultural legacy, our inheritance of irreplaceable
resources. At the same time, we respect and protect
individual property rights.
Complicating the task is the rapid growth of
our knowledge of the interrelationships between
individual actions and public welfare. The
interrelated nature of our environment is
indisputable. The courts must apply the requirements
of the Constitution to these realities and to actions
society takes to meet the challenge of reasonably
protecting people, air, land, water, wildlife and
property.
The carefully crafted limitations that we
have placed on actions that pollute, despoil, or
misuse property - yes, even private property - reflect
a policy path that treads as lightly as possible on
individual property rights while protecting the public
health and safety.
This is the junction - where individual action
crosses public welfare - at which we confront the
protesters with the "takings" banners. Considering
how relevant that protest is to the real point of
contention, the banners could just as accurately
protest attacks on motherhood and apple pie. If the
signs were accurate they would read "GIMME
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GIMME GIMME," "ME FIRST," "I'LL FOLLOW
THE LAWS AND RULES - ONLY IF YOU PAY
ME," or "PAY ME NOT TO POLLUTE."
What is the real concern of these "takings"
protesters? That, sometimes, a regulation in the
public interest may limit or prevent a specific use of
land. However, not all limits to the use of individual
property are "takings" requiring compensation under
the Constitution, just as property owners are not
required to make a reimbursement when government
actions increase the value of private property.
The courts, including the Supreme Court,
throughout our history have not hesitated to measure
the reasonableness of restrictions and have ruled
appropriately when regulations are so strict that the
property owner is entitled to compensation because
the property will be considered to have been
"taken." Recent decisions have clearly shown that in
this area the courts are quite capable and prepared to
see to it that the Constitution's requirements are met.
We have property rights. They are enforced
in the courts. What we do not have - and do not
want - is a new "takings" entitlement program
enshrining an extreme, convoluted "takings" policy
mandating government (taxpayer) payments under
the guise of property rights. What we do not want
and do not need is what the "takings" advocates have
to offer: a radical reinterpretation of the
Constitution.
There are some things we can do to deal
with this debate rationally. First, better local
planning with greater citizen involvement and
commitment to a vision for the community.
Second, greater recognition on the part of
property owners that the biggest factors affecting
their property values are the amenities (roads,
sewers, schools) and protection (health and safety,
local zoning) developed and insured by the
government.
In fact, it is safe to say that actions to
preserve the environment do more to protect and
enhance the value of an individual's private property
than any other kind of law or regulation. (They
certainly accomplish more for the value of private
property than do the actions of the extractive
industries.)
Third, we must foster a greater
understanding that the price of living in our system
of government is the difficult task of balancing
individual freedom with the needs the community,
and an acceptance by those on both sides of the
debate of a shared goal of keeping the scale in
balance.
Fourth, I'd like to see a greater appreciation
on the part of the conservation/environmental
community concerning legitimate concerns of
property owners. The recent Supreme Court decision
Dolan v. Tigard should finally serve as a wake-up
call as to the limit of government's authority over an
individual's property right versus the benefit test.
As our scientific knowledge has evolved, so
has our understanding of where private privilege
ends and public welfare begins. The attitudes of
earlier generations regarding the seemingly unlimited
supply of land that could yield sustenance to anyone
willing to plow, chop, mine, or otherwise extract
were the basis of the 1872 Mining Act and the 1862
Homestead Act and a host of other actions taken to
assure appropriate education and transportation
systems for a developing democracy.
The Homestead Act set out this ideal clearly,
promising to every US citizen over 21 who was a
head of a household, a plot of land so long as "such
application is honestly and in good faith for the
purpose of actual settlement and cultivation... in
order to obtain a home." The fee for an 80-acre plot
under this law was a mere $5.
The infamous 1872 Mining Act similarly
created an incentive for individuals to stake claims to
undeveloped lands. Perhaps appearing benign in
1872, it has grown into a malignancy - a cancer in
1994.
In the long run, these and other
government-sanctioned efforts to extract resources
from the land did more than expand the nation
westward. They threatened the source of the very
wealth of natural resources that provided so many
with so much opportunity. This federal policy
resulted in an environment deficit we still are
struggling to rectify today.
Because unregulated consumptive uses of
land have the potential for dramatic and detrimental
effects on the integrity of a larger environment,
Congress has restricted some activities on private
lands that would jeopardize other public and private
resources. Because of these laws, lawmakers are
portrayed as hostile to the eclipsed 19th century
embodiment of private property rights.
Exaggerating the "takings" definition would
thwart Congressional action on acid rain, toxic
waste, the loss of endangered species, or new
conservation units because the impacted property
rights, out of balance with true public interest, would
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exact billions of dollars as blackmail to enforce the
law and necessary change.
Much as we all might like to return to a
romanticized notion that a man's home is his castle,
Congress would be irresponsible if it ignored the fact
that one person's activities and use of his property
can deprive others of health, safety, or their property
value. This newfound "takings" would grow into a
rip-off for the taxpayer as policy caves into the
argument that we need to pay property owners to do
what the law requires in the public interest.
Incidentally, the rights of those who do not
own property but are subjected to the damaging
effects of some activities on private property deserve
protection, too. In this country, landowners do not
have special privileges. Property rights are not
superior to other rights and must be viewed within
the spectrum of citizens' rights.
The US landscape is the expression of a
rational democratic government's role: the power of
the people, guiding the modern hand of law on the
land for the preservation and conservation of
America's natural and cultural legacy, for today and
tomorrow.
Rep. Bruce Vento (D-Minn) is chairman of
the Natural Resources subcommittee on national
parks, forests, and public lands.
Reprinted by permission of the author and Roll
Call.
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LANDOWNERS FIGHT GREEN LAWS THAT PUT THEM IN RED
Copyright 1994 News World Communications, Inc.
The Washington Times
July 12, 1994, Tuesday, Final Edition
Ronald A. Taylor, The Washington Times
With a Democrat in the White House, an
eco-friendly vice president guiding policy and a
corps of former eco-lobbyists in high places,
environmentalists were ready for a green Clinton
presidency. Instead, the environmental movement
these days is seeing yellow - muzzle flashes from a
combined assault by America's landholders.
Large-scale corporate real estate holders,
America's landed gentry and even the small-scale
landowner are fighting back. They're fed up after
years of losing control of their land to environmental
laws that protect swamps, snail darters, spotted owls
and gnatcatchers. "I call it 'Tea Party' time in
America," said Rep. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Louisiana
Democrat, referring to one of America's best known
acts of protest against regulatory excess in describing
today's battle between landowners and the
environmental bureaucracy.
The battle has reached all the way to the
Supreme Court. It grew out of the Sagebrush
Rebellion of the 1970s, the grass-roots Western
movement to compel the federal government to
divest itself of its vast land holdings, most of them
in the Western states.
Now the focus has shifted from federal lands
to private property and a debate on whether the
government is engaging in land use control in the
name of environmental protection.
When Diana and David Shriner bought 16.5
acres of land next to Escondido Canyon in Southern
California in 1988, they envisioned subdividing the
$809,000 parcel for development. Environmentalists
on the state's Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy,
however, determined that the three houses planned
for the land would ruin hikers' scenic vista. The
Shriners became enmeshed in a regulatory battle with
that state agency, resulting in rezoning so the
property can't be subdivided. The Shriners' case is
just one of scores of examples that property rights
advocates cite to support their assertion that the price
of environmental protection is unconstitutionally
high.
"First of all, we're talking about regulatory
takings rather than eminent domain. We're dealing
with regulations that degrade property values," said
Donald Schmitz, president of the California-based
Fifth Amendment Foundation. "We're not a bunch
of displaced timber workers and ranchers," he said.
RULES IN A CROWDED WORLD
"The Fifth Amendment Foundation is not out
to be involved in a vast philosophical debate about
whether the government has the right to involve
itself in land questions," Mr. Schmitz said. "It's a
crowded world, and we need to have prudent
land-use planning, but we are doing so without any
compensation to the property owner," he said.
"It involves a rather fundamental right that
disturbed the Founding Fathers enough for them to
put it in the Constitution: the right to enjoy the use
of private property without the government coming
in and taking it from you," according to Mr. Tauzin,
one of the key Capitol Hill proponents of what he
and others describe as the battle over property rights.
He is engineering a congressional showdown through
a bill he introduced to make government compensate
property owners whose property values decline by 50
percent or more thanks to government regulations.
Just before the July recess, Mr. Tauzin launched a
drive to force a floor vote on the proposed Property
Owners Bill of Rights. Already, the bill has 156
co-sponsors and only 90 more signatures are
necessary to force a floor vote.
Mr. Tauzin's often-proposed legislation is
gaining momentum at a time when 11 state
legislatures have enacted measures to further protect
property rights by mandating compensation for
government actions that alter property values. In
addition, the move to force a House floor vote on
property rights came on the heels of a rare Supreme
Court ruling in the property rights battle. The high
court said a landowner cannot be forced to give up
control of part of her property as a condition for
permission to expand.
FIGHTING ABSOLUTES
Property rights advocates view the recent
developments as encouraging. Their target is one of
the environmental movement's weak points - statutes
and regulations that place environmental protection
ahead of a landowner's rights.
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Since the enactment of the Endangered
Species Act in 1973 and the revision of the Clean
Water Act in 1972, no project has been too large or
land too sacred to escape regulations and statutes to
protect spotted owls, snail darters or swamps,
property rights advocates say. By digging in on the
property-rights issue, they say, they are attacking the
environmentalists' tendency to resist compromise.
"They have such an absolutist position," said
Nancie G. Marzulla, president and chief counsel to
Defenders of Property Rights, a Washington group
that has been orchestrating landowners' challenges of
environmental regulatory excess. "They believe that
when a butterfly hiccups in China it affects life in
Idaho," she said.
Most of the angst centers around provisions
of the Endangered Species Act and the wetlands
protection section of the Clean Water Act. Under the
Endangered Species Act, development of a parcel of
land can be blocked if the land is part of an
endangered species' habitat. Under the Clean Water
Act's prohibitions against dredging or filling in
"navigable waters of the United States," periodic
inundation is enough to keep many tracts of land
off-limits to development.
Now, as a recent Supreme Court ruling
emphasized, the rights of landowners are making a
comeback. The court ruled in favor of an Oregon
woman who was required to build a bike path and
donate property for a public greenway in order to
expand her plumbing store. "This decision sends a
strong message to local governments that they simply
cannot bully property owners into handing over their
land," said Mrs. Marzulla. The Supreme Court
ruled 5 to 4 for Florence Dolan and her late
husband, John, owners of A-Boy Plumbing in
Tigard, Ore.
The city of Tigard approved their plans to
enlarge their plumbing supply business if they would
donate a 15-foot easement for a public greenway and
an 8-foot strip for a bike path. The land amounts to
10 percent of the Dolans' property. The Dolans
sued, arguing that the city requirement violated the
Fifth Amendment, which says, "Nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
THE LEGAL ISSUE
The Fifth Amendment proscription is at the
heart of most of the property rights battles,
according to Mr. Schmitz. He and other property
rights advocates cite scores of examples of
applications of what they characterize as illegal
"takings" under the Fifth Amendment. Among the
most dramatic cases:
* Yshmael Garcia's Riverside, Calif., home
was destroyed by brushfires last year after he was
denied permission to clear brush near his home as a
firebreak. The brushland in that county has been
declared protected habitat of the endangered
Stephens' kangaroo rat.
* A Pennsylvania man was jailed briefly in
1991 for removing abandoned tires from property
that had been declared wetlands. He refused to
comply with a court directive to halt the removal of
tires.
* Ocie Mills and his son Carey were jailed
for more than a year for violating the Clean Water
Act prohibitions against "discharging pollutants" into
navigable waters of the United States. They had
filled a dry ditch on their quarter-acre Florida lot
with sand. They were released after a federal judge
ruled that their incarceration was unwarranted and
that the land did not meet the definition of a wetland.
Such examples lead property-rights
advocates to insist that, as Mr. Tauzin put it
recently, "The enviros have gone too far." He and
other property rights advocates say that as
environmentalists have gained key policy positions in
the Clinton administration, they have administered
the rules more strictly and, as a result, triggered a
backlash. "The fear that this administration
would let them go full speed ahead has ignited the
private property owner," he said.
Mrs. Marzulla said the backlash is fueled by
the environmentalists' insistence on changing the
way people live. "Had they been satisfied with the
gains of the last 20 years, there wouldn't be a
problem. They've gone beyond environmental
consciousness to land-use planning and land-use
control," she said.
PROTECTING PROPERTY VALUES
Those and other cases have transferred the
issue of environmental takings out of the realm of
debates among law scholars into kitchens and living
rooms where members of grass-roots groups vent
their anger and plot ways to reclaim control of their
land. "One of the main things we're trying to do
here is translate this issue and bring it to the
attention of people in urban areas," Mr. Schmitz
said.
"We need to communicate in suburban and
urban areas a very important issue here: that you can
be secure in your possessions without the
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government taking them away from you. In
environmental takings the government takes the land
and they don't give you a dime," Mr. Schmitz said.
He and other property-rights advocates said
that often the designation of an area as endangered
species habitat or wetlands automatically deflates
property values.
One of the most often cited examples of the
financial impact of environmental regulations on
private property is the case of Ken Healing and his
plans for a dream home in Malibu. Mr. Healing's 2
1/2 acres of land, with bold views of a canyon on
one side and the Pacific coast on the other, is worth
$7,500, instead of the $200,000 it would be worth if
he had a building permit.
The difference in values is what one land
appraiser in 1989 told Mr. Healing his parcel would
be worth as developable property. It is stuck at the
lower value because it was initially declared part of
an environmentally sensitive habitat by the state
coastal commission. After that designation was lifted
in 1987, the commission still refused to grant a
building permit until the matter was reviewed by a
Los Angeles County review board.
GAUGING THE COSTS
While the environmental movement "gained
political power with an attractive message," support
is in danger of eroding when those who embraced a
popular cause run up against the reality of the price
tag, Fifth Amendment Foundation President Schmitz
said.
"The price tag is not strictly fiscal, the price
tag is moral. People are beginning to realize that
when you have this grand concept of a beautiful,
untainted environment, the implementation of the
policy to achieve that goal has resulted in many
cases that abuse individual rights," Mr. Schmitz said.
So far, by attaching property-rights
amendments to legislation under consideration in
Congress, the property-rights advocates have
succeeded in tying up key environmental laws,
including reauthorization of the Endangered Species
Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean
Water Act.
The strategy reflects an effort by Mr. Tauzin
in the House and Sen. Richard Shelby, Alabama
Republican, to force lawmakers to take a stand on
the property-rights issue by attaching to
environmental legislation amendments requiring
compensation for landowners affected by
environmental regulations.
"Every environmental bill that's out there -
Clean Water, Endangered Species reauthorization,
the biological survey, safe drinking water - are
targets of opportunity for those of us who want to
get property rights to the floor and voted on," Mr.
Tauzin said.
Environmentalists say the property-rights
movement's goals are misplaced and that, while it
appears to be a grass-roots movement, is a
well-heeled offshoot of corporate environmental
opponents. Now, the environmentalists are
beginning to fight back. A coalition of 15 major
environmental groups is urging its members to steer
Congress away from legislation it says would reverse
hard-won gains.
A July 6 letter to 400,000 environmental
activists in groups including the Sierra Club, Friends
of the Earth and the Wilderness Society, warned,
"Congress is hearing more from special interest
groups who profit from pollution and from exploiting
public lands and resources than from the majority of
Americans who want to end pollution and protect our
natural resources."
Just before Congress' July recess, 100
environmental-law scholars signed a letter urging
lawmakers to reject the Tauzin amendment, saying
provisions to mandate compensation are "flawed
caricatures of constitutional rules."
Nan Arons, executive director of the
Alliance for Justice, an umbrella group of
public-interest-law organizations, orchestrated that
letter because she says the movement has used
"exaggerated anecdotes" as if "describing major
threats to all property owners."
"No one in the public interest community
opposes the right of people to own and defend their
property. But these folks use takings and the
property rights movement as a way to dismantle
some of the most important public health protections
that exist," she said.
Reprinted from The Washington Times.
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THE NEW NEXUS IN THE REGULATORY TAKING ARENA
Copyright 1994 New York Law Publishing Company
New York Law Journal
July 12, 1994, Tuesday
Steven Barshov and Mark A. Chertok
BY A SCANT 5-4 majority, the U.S.
Supreme Court expanded the rights of private
property owners and concurrently limited local
government land use controls. In its latest regulatory
takings case, Dolan v. City of Tigard,' the Court
places substantial new constraints on the power of
local government to impose conditions on
development approvals.
In contrast to Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Commissions,2 which established a new
categorical taking test for the relatively rare instance
when all economically beneficial use of property is
prohibited, Dolan expands private property rights in
the most common settings for local government land
use regulation -- site plan and subdivision review,
variances and other development approvals.
Issued over a strong dissent delivered from
the bench by Justice John Paul Stevens and a
separate dissent by Justice David H. Souter, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist's majority opinion
requires local governments to conduct an
individualized inquiry to determine whether
conditions on approval are "roughly proportional" to
the impacts anticipated from the proposed
development.
In a striking departure from the prior rule
according such conditions a strong presumption of
constitutionality, Dolan places the burden squarely
on local government to prove the necessary
correlation between the conditions imposed and
impacts expected.
This new burden or proof is a far-reaching
extension of the so-called "essential nexus" standard
articulated in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n.' There, the Court held that a condition
imposed on development must "substantially
advance" a legitimate governmental objective. Dolan
dovetails with Nollan to establish "rough
proportionality" as the criterion for just how close
the nexus must be between a condition and impact in
order to be "substantial." The likely consequence
will be more stringent limits on offset developmental
impacts and municipalities' use of exactions to fund
public improvements.
Florence Dolan owns 1.67 acres of land in
the City of Tigard's Central Business District (CBD).
The parcel is improved with a 9,700 square foot
commercial store and a gravel parking lot. Fanno
Creek flows over a portion of her lot and runs along
its western boundary. The portion of the lot within
the creek's 100-year floodplain is unsuited for
commercial development.
Ms. Dolan sought to redevelop her property
in phases. First, she proposed to enlarge her store to
17,600 square feet and pave a 39 space parking lot.
She then proposed to build an additional structure for
a complementary business and pave more land for
parking. In reviewing the proposed redevelopment
plan, the Planning Commission followed the
mandates of the City's Community Development
Code, including its drainage protection and
transportation components.
The City's Master Drainage Plan is based,
in part, upon a finding that flooding occurs along
Fanno Creek near Ms. Dolan's property. The plan
calls for channel excavation next to her property,
keeping the 100-year floodplain free of structures
and preserving it as a public "greenway."
The code addresses transportation congestion
in the CBD, in part, by providing for a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway to encourage alternatives
to automobiles for short trips. The code requires that
new developments facilitate this objective by
dedication of land for pathways where mapped in the
transportation plan.
Development restrictions in the CBD limit
total site coverage (including structures and paved
parking) to 85 percent of a lot. The remaining 15
percent of the lot must be maintained as open space.
The planning commission approved Ms.
Dolan's redevelopment subject to conditions. First,
she was required to dedicate to the city's public
greenway system the portion of her lot within the
100 year floodplain. She was also required to
dedicate an additional 15 foot strip of land adjacent
to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.
Together the dedications encompass about 7,000
square feet, or 10 percent of the lot. Ms. Dolan was
permitted to apply the dedicated area toward
satisfying the 15 percent open space requirement.
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These conditions were supported by certain
findings. The planning commission found that the
Fanno Creek drainage area was already
overburdened and that increased storm water flow
from her development would add to the need to
manage the stream channel and floodplain. Thus, the
commission concluded that the floodplain dedication
was reasonably related to her request to increase the
impervious surface area of the property and thereby
increase its storm water runoff.
The commission also found that customers
and employees of the existing store and the future
commercial structure could utilize the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway for transportation and
recreational needs. Thus, it concluded that the
pathway could offset some traffic demand and slow
the increase in congestion.
The Tigard City Council affirmed the
commission's determination." Ms. Dolan appealed
to the Land Use Board of Appeals on the ground that
the dedication requirements forced her to choose
between her permit and her right to just
compensation for the easements she would be forced
to dedicate. She further claimed that the city had not
identified any "special benefits" conferred upon her
or any "special quantifiable burdens" caused by her
proposed redevelopment which would justify the
particular dedications. Thus, she argued that the
dedication conditions constituted an uncompensated
taking of her property.
Ms. Dolan's claim was rejected by the board
as well as the Oregon state courts, including the
Court of Appeals5 and the Oregon Supreme Court.'
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the dedication
requirements met the Nollan "essential nexus" test
because the conditions imposed on development were
reasonably related to solving the problems expected
from the proposed development. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed that determination and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
Majority Opinion'
The majority opinion places Dolan within
the analytical rubric of the essential nexus test
developed in Nollan. The first inquiry under this test
is whether a nexus exists between the permit
condition and a legitimate state interest. The nexus
cannot exist if the condition on development does not
"substantially" advance the purported public purpose
for its imposition. Since there was no nexus between
the permit condition at issue in Nollan and any
legitimate governmental interest,' the Supreme
Court had no reason to articulate a standard for
determining the required degree of connection
between the condition and the anticipated impacts of
the development. Dolan fills that gap.
Applying the first prong of the essential
nexus test to Tigard's dedication conditions, the
majority had no difficulty concluding that the
prevention of flooding and reduction of traffic
congestion in the CBD qualify as legitimate public
purposes/state interests. The majority also found that
limiting development in the 100-year floodplain
furthers the goal of flood prevention. The same
nexus exists between providing a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway and the goal of reducing traffic congestion
in the CBD.
Having found that both dedication conditions
met the first element of the essential nexus test, the
majority turned to what had been left unanswered in
Nollan -- the tightness of the fit between the means
and the ends, or, in other words, whether the
conditions imposed on the property owner "bear the
required relationship to the projected impact of [the]
proposed development. "' Recognizing the lack of
federal precedent, the majority reviewed relevant
state court decisions.
The Court rejected as too lax those states
which were satisfied with very generalized
statements as to the necessary connection between
the mandated dedication and the impacts of proposed
development. o It also rejected the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test," concluding that the
federal constitution does not require that a
governmental exaction be directly proportional to the
need created by the proposed development. Rather,
the majority opted for an intermediate test which it
denominated "rough proportionality:"
No precise mathematical calculation is
required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development.12
In applying this new standard, the majority
places the burden of proof upon the municipality
imposing the condition.' 3 It must demonstrate that
the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the anticipated development impacts. The
majority concluded that Tigard failed to meet its
burden.
As to the floodplain dedication, the majority
found that the nature of the proposed dedication
lacked the requisite connection to the city's goals.
The majority focused upon the requirement that Ms.
Dolan dedicate her floodplain property to form a part
of the city greenway park system. It could discern no
flood protection purpose in requiring the property to
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be dedicated for public recreational use.14 The
Court appeared sympathetic to the legality of
precluding development on the floodplain without
requiring a dedication for public recreational use. In
essence, it concluded that the city's interest in flood
protection along Fanno Creek could be satisfied by
a private greenway, but could not support the
dedication of a public one."
On the pedestrian/bicycle pathway
dedication, the majority's focus was more
quantitative. The city found that the
pedestrian/bicycle path could offset some of the
traffic demand and lessen the increase in traffic
congestion. However, the Court found that such a
general finding was insufficient and indicated that the
city must demonstrate that the additional number of
vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the proposed
development were reasonably related to the
requirement for a dedication of the pathway
easement.
Although the majority reemphasized that no
precise mathematical calculation is required, local
government must make some effort to quantify its
findings and cannot rely merely upon conclusory
statements.
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justices
Harry A. Blackmun and Ruth Bader Ginsburg,"
attacks the "rough proportionality" test as
unprecedented in both state and federal cases.
Indeed, the dissent points out that none of the state
court cases relied upon by the majority contain
'anything akin to a 'rough proportionality'
requirement." 7
Justice Stevens castigates the majority for
ignoring entirely the benefits which would have been
conferred upon Ms. Dolan had she accepted the
conditions and the permit. Leaving her with
ownership of undevelopable land in the floodplain
would have left her with the duty to maintain the
land, with tort liability and with the obligation to pay
taxes on the land. On the other hand, requiring
dedication could have generated potential customers
and would have eliminated the tort liability, the cost
of maintenance and the tax burden.
In essence, the dissent accuses the majority
of artificially parsing its analysis instead of
considering the nature of the entire transaction. By
focusing on Ms. Dolan's inability to exclude the
public from the dedicated greenway in isolation from
the other aspects of the entire transaction, the
dissenters accuse the majority of elevating that single
strand of a property owner's bundle of rights above
the entire transaction.18
While the dissent had no problems with the
majority's initial use of the Nollan nexus test, they
would not shift the burden of proof once the
existence of the nexus is confirmed. Rather, they
would cloak the development condition with a strong
presumption of constitutionality and would require
the property owner to prove that a "concededly
germane condition is so grossly disproportionate to
the proposed development's adverse effects that it
manifests motives other than land use regulation on
the part of the city.""
The dissent also takes issue with the
theoretical underpinning of the majority opinion.
Despite the majority opinion's assertion that no
precise mathematical calculation is required, Justice
Stevens noted that the city was still required to
quantify the rough proportionality. As a result, the
dissenters contend that Dolan is a judicial
micromanaging of matters best left to local
government and indicates a return to the type of
substantive due process review which occurred in the
oft-criticized Lochner era.'
The dissenters conclude that the public
interest in averting the problems of urban life --
floods, traffic congestion, environmental harm, etc.
-- outweigh the private interest of the commercial
entrepreneur. If the conditions imposed by
government are rational and conducive to fulfilling
valid land use objectives, the burden of overturning
those conditions should rest squarely upon the
property owner.
In his separate dissent, Justice Souter saw no
reason to go beyond Nollan in this case. He noted
that the dedication of the greenway was not defective
because of any lack of proportionality, but because
there was no connection at all between flood
protection measures to mitigate increased storm
water runoff and the recreational greenway
dedication.
However, he stresses that the city never
claimed a nexus between the recreational dedication
and flood protection. Rather, it treated the dedication
as "ancillary" to flood protection and more closely
linked to the pathway dedication. In that regard,
Justice Souter criticizes the majority for striking
down the pedestrian/bicycle pathway merely because
the city's findings stated that it could (as opposed to
would) offset adverse impacts,
In essence, Justice Souter views the
conditions imposed as typical subdivision exactions
which, in fact, were drafted to accomplish their
intended purposes. With Nollan satisfied, he would
not have chosen Dolan to extend the law of
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regulatory takings in regard to local government
development exactions.
Conclusion
The principal effect of Dolan will be the
increased burden placed upon local governments to
justify conditions imposed upon development
approvals. This is likely to generate additional
consequences.
First, developers will be asked to provide
more data and information about proposed projects
so that municipalities can "quantify" the "rough
proportionality" between conditions and development
impacts. Indeed, local governments may
increasingly require developers to shoulder the
additional costs of municipal consultants to ascertain
and evaluate such information.
Second, the decision is likely to spawn
litigation over the sufficiency of the relationship
between the conditions imposed and the impacts to
be ameliorated. There is very little guidance in
Dolan as to how much proportionality is required or
whether there is a minimum threshold.
Third, local governments will be less likely
to impose conditions to prevent or mitigate
developmental impacts or to impose exactions to
fund public improvements. As a result, there will be
increased reliance upon general tax revenues,
bonding, special purpose districts and other
mechanisms to finance public improvements.
Fourth, local governments will be more
inclined to tighten zoning ordinances, since such
"legislative restrictions" are easier to defend under
Dolan than the quasi-adjudicatory decisions generally
entailed in developmental approvals.
The rule of "rough proportionality" and
shifting of the traditional burden of proof enunciated
in Dolan appears intended to inure to the benefit of
private property owners. The unintended result,
however, is that local governments may increasingly
rely on zoning, rather than on more site-specific
approval processes, to protect against the adverse
impacts of development.
Clearly, regardless of the impact upon
zoning and public finance, the most definite result of
Dolan will be to increase the cost and complexity of
developmental review. In attempting to aid property
owners, the Dolan cure may be worse than the
disease.
Steven Barshov is of counsel and Mark A. Chertok is
a partner with Sive, Paget & Riesel, P. C
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Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court has once again
signaled a desire to opine upon the land
use/regulatory taking issue by agreeing to hear the
case of Dolan v. City of Tigard,' argued before the
Court March 23, 1994.
As someone who regularly purports to tell
the Court how it should have decided land use cases
in practitioner or academic writing,' I thought I
would help the Court in advance this time. In
particular, since the Court has expressed
considerable difficulty in deciding the so-called
"taking" cases, as a good sport (which I hope the
members of the Court are as well), I have prepared
a draft opinion in Dolan. Realizing this is more than
a little presumptuous, as I have not been nominated
for the Court, let alone had my nomination approved
by the U.S. Senate,' here, nonetheless, it is.
I. Factual Summary of Dolan v. City of Tigard
The Dolans own 1.67 acres of land in
downtown Tigard, a suburb of Portland, Oregon, on
which they run an electric and plumbing supply
business. The land, currently used for general retail
sales, is within the city's "central business district"
zone and is subject to an 'action area" overlay zone
(CBD-AA zone). The Dolans applied to the city for
a permit to replace the existing 9,700-square foot
building with a 17,600-square foot building in which
to relocate their electric and plumbing supply
business. The Dolans also wanted to expand their
parking lot.5
Tigard granted the Dolans' application, but
required as conditions that the Dolans dedicate the
portion of their property lying within the 100-year
floodplain of Fanno Creek for improvement of a
storm drainage system and an additional fifteen-foot
strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway.' The required dedication
comprises about 7,000 square feet, or approximately
ten percent of the total property.
The Dolans requested a variance from these
conditions. In its final order denying the variance
the city's zoning commission made the following
pertinent findings.
It is reasonable to assume that
customers and employees of the future uses
of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway adjacent to this development for
their transportation and recreational needs.
In fact, the site plan has provided for
bicycle parking in a rack in front of the
proposed building to provide for the needs
of the facility's customers and employees. It
is reasonable to expect that some of the
users of the bicycle parking provided for by
the site plan will use the pathway adjacent to
Fanno Creek if it is constructed. In addition,
the proposed expanded use of this site is
anticipated to generate additional vehicular
traffic, thereby increasing congestion on
nearby collector and arterial streets.
Creation of a convenient, safe
pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an
alternative means of transportation could
offset some of the traffic demand on these
nearby streets and lessen the increase in
traffic congestion.'
The report went on to address the required
dedication of the portion of the property that lies in
the Fanno Creek floodplain.
The Commission finds that the required
dedication would be reasonably related to
the applicant's request to intensify the usage
of this site, thereby increasing the site's
impervious area. The increased impervious
surface would be expected to increase the
amount of storm water runoff from the site
to Fanno Creek. The Fanno Creek drainage
basin has experienced rapid urbanization
over the past 30 years causing a significant
increase in stream flows after periods of
precipitation. The anticipated increased
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storm water flow from the subject property
to an already strained creek and drainage
basin can only add to the public need to
manage the stream channel and floodplain
for drainage purposes.'o
The Dolans appealed the variance denial to
the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals," the
Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Oregon Supreme
Court,12 all of which affirmed the denial and the
required conditions on the permit."
With the Supreme Court's indulgence, here
is my version of the resolution of the case
presented.' 4
II. Draft Opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard
Judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court
reversed and case remanded. [sv2,1]
KMIEC, J., [sitting in for Justice Ginsburg
- because who knows what her views are on this
stuff], delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
the CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justices SCALIA and
THOMAS join. Justices O'CONNOR and
KENNEDY file a concurring opinion [in order to
maintain their reputation as swing voters]. Justices
STEVENS and BLACKMUN dissent on the merits,
since modem government hardly could go on if it
had to compensate for alleged takings of property
like the one in this case. Justice SOUTER dissents,
finding the writ of certiorari to have been granted
improvidently. "
John Dolan died during the course of this
litigation. His widow, Florence, carried the case to
this Court.'1
We've said so darn much on this regulatory
taking puzzle, it may be helpful to briefly summarize
the legal principles that can be derived from our
prior cases.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), we invalidated
a law that required Mrs. Loretto, as landlady, to
allow a cable television company to install a cable
running down the front of her building and a cable
box on her roof. We observed that where the
character of the government's action is in the form
of a permanent physical occupation, it is not only an
important factor in resolving whether the action
works a taking but it is also determinative. Id. at
426.
Loretto was an easy case. We've asked our
clerks to find more of them in the cert pool. Instead,
they gave us this case. You just can't find good help.
In Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct.
1522 (1992), we told John and Irene Yee, mobile
home park owners, that they did not suffer a
physical taking, even though the combined effect of
city and state law gave tenants an alienable right to
occupy their mobile home lots indefinitely at a fixed
price. We understand that this case serves as
regulatory inspiration for Mrs. Clinton's health care
reforms. The majority is not sure that's so good, but
in any event, we noted with our usual level of
inscrutability that where landowners open their
property to occupation by others (by renting), they
"cannot assert a per se right to compensation based
on their inability to exclude particular individuals,"
a point we premised upon PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), where we
upheld a California law precluding a private
shopping mall from excluding leafletters. Yee, 112
S. Ct. at 1530.
If this result seems hard to square with
Loretto, it probably is. As people appointed for life
and whose salaries cannot be diminished, we
sometimes feel little obligation to be consistent. The
distinction we manufactured to distinguish Yee from
Loretto was that the Yees voluntarily chose to go
into the mobile home business, and thus, we said
they could avoid the regulation - get this - by going
out of business. In the more polite words of our
opinion, there was no "required acquiescence." Id.
at 1528 (quoting FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480
U.S. 245, 252 (1987)). Why Loretto is any different
than Yee is a bit mystifying - after all, Mrs. Loretto,
too, could have avoided the cable installation by
tearing down her apartment structure and enjoying
the passive recreational beauty of a vacant lot.
Nevertheless, if you wish to humor us,
perhaps the distinction between Loretto and Yee is
that in the former we could see and understand the
cable and box as physically occupying Mrs.
Loretto's space; in Yee, we were unwilling to
concede that the combined effect of rent control and
tenant limitations was to physically impose tenants
on landlords. Thus, our formal holding goes
something like this - Loretto held that compensation
for a per se physical taking could not be avoided by
arguing that the owner can go out of business
because her right to do business (rent) may not be
conditioned on forfeiting her right to compensation
for a per se taking. In Yee, there was no right to
compensation to be forfeited because a city rent
control ordinance, even when considered against a
state tenant limitation, is a regulation of use, not a
physical occupation. It would be a different case, we
said, if the government required a physical
occupation (of the type imposed on Mrs. Loretto),
Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1531, or prevented the owner
from making a change in use (going out of business).
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Id. at 1528-29. There must, in short, be elements of
"required acquiescence" present.
We bet we got everybody's attention with
our decision in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), when we
invalidated a beach easement condition on a building
permit because, ostensibly, an easement facilitating
the strolling of people already on the beach did not
advance the government's objective of breaking
down the "psychological barrier" - caused by the
enlargement of Jim and Marilyn's home - directed at
people off the beach. Much to the consternation of
our dissenting brethren today, this opinion seems to
require that courts actually inquire into whether land
use regulation bears a meaningful relationship to its
intended end. Thus, we said an outright taking of an
easement would be a per se taking requiring
compensation, just like in Loretto. However, a
landowner seeking a permit can be required to make
a property concession, if that concession or condition
substantially furthers governmental purposes that
would justify denial of the permit. The condition or
concession must serve the same purpose as the
justification for prohibiting the use without a permit.
Id. at 831-37.
Even though some Supreme Court
commentators have always looked upon Nollan as
something of an aberration,'" they are quite fond of
the Court's opinion in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which
denied the owner of a railroad terminal the ability to
build an office tower above it because the landmarks
commission thought the terminal too pretty to
change. Justice William Brennan wrote the majority
opinion, in which we held that in determining
whether there is a regulatory taking, the Court's
inquiry is premised upon the application of several
ad hoc 'factual inquiries. Id. at 124. The inquiry
includes: (1) the "economic impact" of the
regulation, or in other words, does a valuable use
remain considered in light of the whole, not separate
elements of, the property - a view Justice Brennan
exhumed from Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922); (2) whether the regulation has interfered with
"distinct investment-backed expectations," that is,
whether the state law or other representations of
government give the owners a "vested right" or
whether the owners have an "investment-backed"
expectation in a subpart, like air rights, of the
property; and (3) the "character" of the
government's action - physical invasion vs.
regulation. Prior to Penn Central, many lawyers
schooled in the common law (and even our
precedents) presumed that the "character" issue
referred to whether the regulation was for harm
prevention or benefit acquisition. In a crafty lil'
footnote, however, Justice Brennan said it didn't
matter to him whether regulation was aimed at
controlling noxious uses or maintaining pretty things
like landmark buildings. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
133 n.30.
Skipping over the repetition of Penn Central
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding state law precluding
a mining company from removing twenty-seven
million tons of coal from the earth), we come to our
recent opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). In Lucas, we
questioned whether South Carolina had a good
enough reason to tell Dave Lucas that he couldn't
build houses on a pair of subdivided lots worth close
to a million dollars, even though there were already
houses on either side of the lots. We observed that
regulation denying an owner all "economically viable
use of his land" constitutes a discrete category of
regulatory takings that requires compensation. Id. at
2893-94. This obligation to compensate cannot be
avoided merely by asserting that the regulation is
aimed at a harmful or noxious use.
Thus, we pointed out that harmful or
noxious use is the forerunner of the current taking
test, which asserts that regulation will be a taking if
it fails to substantially advance a legitimate state
interest. A total deprivation of economic value can
only be sustained under this standard where a
"logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with." Id. at 2899.
In other words, this type of profound or severe
regulation must do no more than duplicate that of
common law nuisance. In a case of total deprivation
like Lucas, the government bears the burden of
proof, id. at 2901-02, which we understand South
Carolina failed to meet on remand. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486
(S.C. 1992). Before the issue of actual damages
could be tried, South Carolina entered into a
negotiated settlement with Mr. Lucas whereby he
received $ 425,000 for each of the two lots and $
725,000 in interest, attorney's fees and costs, for a
whopping regulatory taking total of $ 1,575,000.
Apparently, however, it's no fun regulating if it's
not for "free," as South Carolina has now resold Mr.
Lucas' lots to a construction company for $ 785,000.
Justice SCALIA wrote a crafty lil' footnote
of his own in Lucas, noting that whether a regulation
results in total deprivation is to be determined in
relation to how the owner's reasonable expectations
have been shaped by the state's law of property -
that is, whether and to what extent the state law has
recognized and protected the particular interest
alleged to be taken. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
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Justice SCALIA gives two very different types of
examples of where such calculation problems arise -
deprivation of 90% of a fee simple vs. deprivation of
the fee simple, itself. The first percentage example
is quantitative; the other is definitional - that is,
related to a recognized estate in land. It's unclear
whether Justice SCALIA thought the percentage
example merited compensation, and he gave up
thinking about it, by deciding that he didn't have to
decide this issue in Lucas because the pleading
established a total deprivation. Id.
The significance of the interpretation of this
footnote cannot be understated because it determines
whether the holding in Lucas is limited to the
mercifully rare case of total wipeout of everything or
whether it can be made to apply to the far more
plentiful case where the state's law of property
affirms segmented interests in property and one of
those segments - like the air rights in Penn Central
or the twenty-seven million tons of coal and
accompanying support estates in Keystone is
rendered useless by regulation. In keeping with the
tradition of the Court, we won't settle this issue
today either, but will continue to tease you.
Having bored you silly with the restatement
of our prior law, let's turn now to the Dolans
(rhymes with Nollans) and the insistence of the City
of Tigard that customers buying heavy metal pipes,
bathtubs, and such at a retail plumbing supply store
might like the convenience of transporting these
items by bicycle.
The central issue for review in this Court is
the constitutional validity of the stated conditions on
the permit, and thus, this case presents another
opportunity for this Court to resolve the nettlesome
problem of when regulation goes "too far, " in the
immortal but less than helpful words of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). As is well
known, if regulation does go "too far," it merits
compensation under the Constitution's taking clause,
which provides that "nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation."
U.S. Const. amend. V (applied to the city in this
instance via U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
While the authorized physical invasion in
this case might suggest that the case could be easily
resolved on the basis of our per se or categorical
rule stated in Loretto, our later decisions in
PruneYard and Yee, and more particularly, the very
decision of Nollan on which the landowners rely
greatly, suggest that some physical invasions or
property concessions are not compensable. In
particular, from Yee we know that there must be
"required acquiescence" in the sense that the
landowner must be put to the choice of forfeiting the
right to constitutional compensation for physical
occupation in order to make lawful use of property.
In Yee, we pretended to avoid that impermissible
choice, dubiously, to be sure, because we concluded
that rent control and tenant limitations did not
amount to a physical occupation, and therefore, there
was no right to compensation to be forfeited.
But here, the condition does mandate
physical invasion; indeed, it is conditioned on far
more - the actual conveyance or dedication of
property in exchange for a permit to make an
otherwise lawful expansion of a commercial
structure. It is true, of course, that in Nollan we held
that a property concession could be required of a
landowner as a condition of a grant of a permit if the
condition substantially furthers the same
governmental purposes that would justify a denial of
the permit. Two issues thus emerge: what are the
government's purposes here, and do the conditions
substantially advance those purposes?
As to the city's purposes, Tigard's concerns
are for a complete bicycle pathway and an adequate
drainage system. It is not for this Court to question
these purposes. As we said in Nollan, our cases
make clear that a broad range of governmental
purposes can satisfy the requirements. Nollan, 483
U.S. at 834-35. However, our decision in Penn
Central as well as Keystone suggests that one salient
factor is the "character," or "purpose" if you will, of
the government's action. In this regard, we believe
there are less taking concerns raised by regulation
aimed at controlling a harmful or noxious use, than
by regulation that is merely trying to secure a benefit
for the community at large from a particular
landowner.
Of course, in Lucas, we pointed out the
difficulty of distinguishing between harms and
benefits, a distinction that was blurred by Justice
Brennan in a footnote in Penn Central. To bring
clarity to this matter, we opined in Lucas, that at
least in the case where regulation has totally denied
an owner of all economic viability, there must be an
antecedent inquiry to determine whether the
regulatory limitation can properly be said to inhere
in the owner's title. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. That
is, the government regulator must show that the
regulation merely denies a use that the landowner
should have never expected to undertake or make.
Tigard argues that Lucas is not applicable to
this case because the Dolans cannot possibly claim
that the conditions here deprive them of all economic
value. This, of course, raises the issue of how to
properly characterize what has been lost. Our
brothers Holmes and Brandeis in Pennsylvania Coal
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differed greatly over this issue - Holmes focused on
the complete taking of the part, Pennsylvania Coal,
260 U.S. at 414, and Brandeis focused on the
incomplete taking of the whole. Id. at 419 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Even though Brandeis dissented in
Pennsylvania Coal, his view seemed to prevail in
Penn Central and Keystone with an important
qualification. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31;
Keystone, 480 U.S. 496-502. In Penn Central, we
observed that taking considerations must also be
informed by a landowner's reasonable investment
backed expectations, and these in turn will be
informed by the state's law of property. We
reiterated this proposition in Lucas, although it was
unnecessary in that context to expand on the point.
Can it be said that the Dolans have been
deprived of all economic viability with respect to
"reasonable investment-backed expectation;" that is,
a property interest or segment discretely recognized
under state law? We think so. Easements of the type
requisitioned by Tigard for the bikeway have long
been part of the common law and are a recognized
part of the law of the State of Oregon. See State v.
California Or. Power Co., 358 P.2d 524, 526-27
(Or. 1961); Steelhammer v. Clackamas County, 135
P.2d 292, 296 (Or. 1943). So too, the city requires
the Dolans to convey a subdivided portion of their
recognized fee interest in land that exists within the
designated floodplain. One hundred percent of these
interests are conveyed to Tigard, and in our
judgment this places the burden on Tigard to
demonstrate that the bikeway and floodplain
dedications inhere in the title of all similarly situated
landowners. This we think Tigard will be unable to
show, although we remand for this purpose.
Our concurring members dispute the
applicability of Lucas to these facts, choosing to
reach a common result, but relying instead upon our
decision in Nollan. Nollan, unlike Lucas, does not
substantively inquire into whether the government's
regulation is the equivalent of the common law of
nuisance, and thus, logically denies the landowner
nothing to which he would be entitled. Rather,
Nollan focuses on the nexus between regulatory
means and ends and the landowner's responsibility
for the need for the regulation at all. Even if we
were to agree with concurring Justices KENNEDY
and O'CONNOR and assume that Lucas does not
apply because of the value remaining in the Dolans'
parcel, we think the outcome under Nollan would be
much the same.
In Nollan, we articulated that the nexus
requirement "was more than a pleading
requirement," Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841, and we
described the standard of substantially advancing a
legitimate state interest. While Tigard argues that
this does not alter the rational basis or reasonably
related standard, we think Tigard misreads Nollan.
We specifically advanced in Nollan that the judicial
standard of review applied in taking cases like this
one is higher than that applied in general due process
or equal protection challenges to economic
regulation. Id. at 834 n.3. Moreover, with great
relevance to this case, we posited that if a landowner
is singled out to bear the burden of problems that
have been generally created, such singling out might
well violate the Takings or Equal Protection Clauses.
Id. at 835 n.4.
We think the Dolans are being singled out
here. Tigard's interest is really a complete bike
pathway. There is no credible showing in this record
that the Dolans' plans necessitate the bikeway
generally nor increase traffic to necessitate
facilitating this alternative form of transportation.
Bikeways are nice, but they are general community
improvements that redound to the benefit of the
community, and therefore, they ought to be paid for
by the community from general revenues, not
exacted (need we say, extorted) from this individual
landowner. So too, the record contains no hard
information about how the Dolans' plan necessitates
the dedication for drainage. True, the landowners'
expansion will cover more ground, making it
somewhat more impervious, but this is a far cry
from justifying that the particular greenway is
thereby needed to address an identified drainage
problem caused by this landowner.
By these comments, Tigard may insist that
we are second-guessing the local legislature, and in
truth, we can see how inquiring as to what is needed
or necessitated by a particular land use gives this
impression. However, we do not question the
legitimacy of avoiding flooding or traffic
congestion," or even promoting bike riding, we
merely do not see how, in the Nollan sense of
avoiding disproportionate singling out, this
landowner can be asked to donate his land for those
purposes on this record. Because this focus on the
nexus between this landowner and the government's
stated end or objective is somewhat different than
that raised in Nollan, (which was merely the nexus
between regulatory means and end), the majority
chooses to more forthrightly address the legitimacy
of this governmental condition in terms of the Lucas
methodology that asks simply whether the failure of
the Dolans to provide a bikeway and drainage
greenway could be said to be nuisance-like in light
of the separate property interests previously
recognized by the state in statute and common law?
Again, we doubt it, but we remand for proper
proceedings on this point.
Reversed and remanded.
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The concurring opinion of Justices
KENNEDY and O'CONNOR are as reflected in the
Court's opinion. If they want it published separately,
let them write their own law review article.
The dissenting opinions of Justices
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and [wouldn't you know
it] SOUTER" are omitted. They're all wrong,
anyway. Trust me on this one. I'm not kidding."
*. Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame;
fmr. Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice. This draft
opinion was initially prepared to accompany the
keynote address to the Rocky Mountain Land Use
Institute at the University of Denver College of Law,
March, 1994. The author thanks Professor Edward
H. Ziegler for the invitation to address the
conference. No disrespect to any person living or
dead (especially those who are still living and can
respond in kind) is intended by the author; what is
intended, and recommended, is the willingness to
laugh at our ability to make that which is
straightforward, complex.
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purpose and providing for alternative means of
transportation. Pp. 11-12.
(c) In deciding the second question--whether the
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the conditions imposed on Dolan's permit--the
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Amendment is "rough proportionality." No precise
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must make some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the proposed development's impact.
This is essentially the "reasonable relationship" test
adopted by the majority of the state courts. Pp.
12-16.
(d) The findings upon which the city relies do not
show the required reasonable relationship between
the floodplain easement and Dolan's proposed
building. The Community Development Code
already required that Dolan leave 15% of her
property as open space, and the undeveloped
floodplain would have nearly satisfied that
requirement. However, the city has never said why
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CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Petitioner challenges the decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court which held that the city of
Tigard could condition the approval of her building
permit on the dedication of a portion of her property
for flood control and traffic improvements. 317 Ore.
110, 854 P. 2d 437 (1993). We granted certiorari to
resolve a question left open by our decision in
Nollan v. California Coastal of what is the required
degree of connection between the exactions imposed
by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed
development.
I
The State of Oregon enacted a
comprehensive land use management program in
1973. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.005-197.860 (1991).
The program required all Oregon cities and counties
to adopt new comprehensive land use plans that were
consistent with the statewide planning goals. §§
197.175(1), 197.250. The plans are implemented by
land use regulations which are part of an integrated
hierarchy of legally binding goals, plans, and
regulations. §§ 197.175, 197.175(2)(b). Pursuant to
the State's requirements, the city of Tigard, a
community of some 30,000 residents on the
southwest edge of Portland, developed a
comprehensive plan and codified it in its Community
Development Code (CDC). The CDC requires
property owners in the area zoned Central Business
District to comply with a 15% open space and
landscaping requirement, which limits total site
coverage, including all structures and paved parking,
to 85% of the parcel. CDC, ch. 18.66, App. to Pet.
for Cert. G16-G17. After the completion of a
transportation study that identified congestion in the
Central Business District as a particular problem, the
city adopted a plan for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway
intended to encourage alternatives to automobile
transportation for short trips. The CDC requires that
new development facilitate this plan by dedicating
land for pedestrian pathways where provided for in
the pedestrian/bicycle pathway plan.'
The city also adopted a Master Drainage
Plan (Drainage Plan). The Drainage Plan noted that
flooding occurred in several areas along Fanno
Creek, including areas near petitioner's property.
Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 2, pp. 2-5 to 2-8; 4-2 to
4-6; Figure 4-1. The Drainage Plan also established
that the increase in impervious surfaces associated
with continued urbanization would exacerbate these
flooding problems. To combat these risks, the
Drainage Plan suggested a series of improvements to
the Fanno Creek Basin, including channel excavation
in the area next to petitioner's property. App. to Pet.
for Cert. G13, G38. Other recommendations
included ensuring that the floodplain remains free of
structures and that it be preserved as greenways to
minimize flood damage to structures. Record, Doc.
No. F, ch. 5, pp. 5-16 to 5-21. The Drainage Plan
concluded that the cost of these improvements should
be shared based on both direct and indirect benefits,
with property owners along the waterways paying
more due to the direct benefit that they would
receive. Id., ch. 8, p. 8-11. CDC Chapters 18.84,
18.86 and CDC § 18.164.100 and the Tigard Park
Plan carry out these recommendations.
Petitioner Florence Dolan owns a plumbing
and electric supply store located on Main Street in
the Central Business District of the city. The store
covers approximately 9,700 square feet on the
eastern side of a 1.67-acre parcel, which includes a
gravel parking lot. Fanno Creek flows through the
southwestern corner of the lot and along its western
boundary. The year-round flow of the creek renders
the area within the creek's 100-year floodplain
virtually unusable for commercial development. The
city's comprehensive plan includes the Fanno Creek
floodplain as part of the city's greenway system.
Petitioner applied to the city for a permit to
redevelop the site. Her proposed plans called for
nearly doubling the size of the store to 17,600 square
feet, and paving a 39-space parking lot. The existing
store, located on the opposite side of the parcel,
would be razed in sections as construction
progressed on the new building. In the second phase
of the project, petitioner proposed to build an
additional structure on the northeast side of the site
for complementary businesses, and to provide more
parking. The proposed expansion and intensified use
are consistent with the city's zoning scheme in the
Central Business District. CDC § 18.66.030. App.
to Brief for Petitioner Cl-C2.
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The City Planning Commission granted
petitioner's permit application subject to conditions
imposed by the city's CDC. The CDC establishes the
following standard for site development review
approval:
"Where landfill and/or development is
allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year
floodplain, the city shall require the
dedication of sufficient open land area for
greenway adjoining and within the
floodplain. This area shall include portions
at a suitable elevation for the construction of
a pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the
floodplain in accordance with the adopted
pedestrian/bicycle plan.' CDC §
18.120.180.A.8, App. to Brief for
Respondent.
Thus, the Commission required that petitioner
dedicate the portion of her property lying within the
100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm
drainage system along Fanno Creek and that she
dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent
to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.'
The dedication required by that condition
encompasses approximately 7,000 square feet, or
roughly 10% of the property. In accordance with
city practice, petitioner could rely on the dedicated
property to meet the 15% open space and
landscaping requirement mandated by the city's
zoning scheme. App. to Pet. for Cert. G28-G29. The
city would bear the cost of maintaining a landscaped
buffer between the dedicated area and the new store.
Id., at G44-G45.
Petitioner requested variances from the CDC
standards. Variances are granted only where it can
be shown that, owing to special circumstances
related to a specific piece of the land, the literal
interpretation of the applicable zoning provisions
would cause "an undue or unnecessary hardship"
unless the variance is granted. CDC § 18.134.010.
App. to Brief for Respondent B-47.' Rather than
posing alternative mitigating measures to offset the
expected impacts of her proposed development, as
allowed under the CDC, petitioner simply argued
that her proposed development would not conflict
with the policies of the comprehensive plan. Id., at
E-4. The Commission denied the request.
The Commission made a series of findings
concerning the relationship between the dedicated
conditions and the projected impacts of petitioner's
project. First, the Commission noted that "it is
reasonable to assume that customers and employees
of the future uses of this site could utilize a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this
development for their transportation and recreational
needs." City of Tigard Planning Commission Final
Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. G24.
The Commission noted that the site plan has
provided for bicycle parking in a rack in front of the
proposed building and "it is reasonable to expect that
some of the users of the bicycle parking provided for
by the site plan will use the pathway adjacent to
Fanno Creek if it is constructed." Ibid. In addition,
the Commission found that creation of a convenient,
safe pedestrian/ bicycle pathway system as an
alternative means of transportation "could offset
some of the traffic demand on [nearby] streets and
lessen the increase in traffic congestion." Ibid.
The Commission went on to note that the
required floodplain dedication would be reasonably
related to petitioner's request to intensify the use of
the site given the increase in the impervious surface.
The Commission stated that the "anticipated
increased storm water flow from the subject property
to an already strained creek and drainage basin can
only add to the public need to manage the stream
channel and floodplain for drainage purposes." Id.,
at G37. Based on this anticipated increased storm
water flow, the Commission concluded that "the
requirement of dedication of the floodplain area on
the site is related to the applicant's plan to intensify
development on the site." Ibid. The Tigard City
Council approved the Commission's final order,
subject to one minor modification; the City Council
reassigned the responsibility for surveying and
marking the floodplain area from petitioner to the
city's engineering department. Id., at G-7.
Petitioner appealed to the Land Use Board of
Appeals (LUBA) on the ground that the city's
dedication requirements were not related to the
proposed development, and, therefore, those
requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of
their property under the Fifth Amendment. In
evaluating the federal taking claim, LUBA assumed
that the city's findings about the impacts of the
proposed development were supported by substantial
evidence. Dolan v. Tigard, LUBA 91-161 (Jan. 7,
1992), reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. D-15, n.
9. Given the undisputed fact that the proposed larger
building and paved parking area would increase the
amount of impervious surfaces and the runoff into
Fanno Creek, LUBA concluded that "there is a
'reasonable relationship' between the proposed
development and the requirement to dedicate land
along Fanno Creek for a greenway." Id., at D-16.
With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway,
LUBA noted the Commission's finding that a
significantly larger retail sales building and parking
lot would attract larger numbers of customers and
employees and their vehicles. It again found a
"reasonable relationship" between alleviating the
impacts of increased traffic from the development
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and facilitating the provision of a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway as an alternative means of transportation.
Ibid.
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed,
rejecting petitioner's contention that in Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), we had
abandoned the "reasonable relationship" test in favor
of a stricter "essential nexus" test. 113 Ore. App.
162, 832 P. 2d 853 (1992). The Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P. 2d 437
(1993). The court also disagreed with petitioner's
contention that the Nollan Court abandoned the
"reasonably related" test. Id., at 118, 854 P. 2d, at
442. Instead, the court read Nollan to mean that an
"exaction is reasonably related to an impact if the
exaction serves the same purpose that a denial of the
permit would serve." Id., at 120, 854 P. 2d, at 443.
The court decided that both the pedestrian/bicycle
pathway condition and the storm drainage dedication
had an essential nexus to the development of the
proposed site. Id., at 121, 854 P. 2d, at 443.
Therefore, the court found the conditions to be
reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of
petitioner's business. Ibid.4 We granted certiorari,
510 U.S. (1993), because of an alleged conflict
between the Oregon Supreme Court's decision and
our decision in Nollan, supra.
H
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, made applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
239, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897), provides:
"Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."s One of the principal
purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 4 L.
Ed. 2d 1554, 80 S. Ct. 1563 (1960). Without
question, had the city simply required petitioner to
dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public
use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit
to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a
taking would have occurred. Nollan, supra, at 831.
Such public access would deprive petitioner of the
right to exclude others, "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 100 S.
Ct. 383 (1979).
On the other side of the ledger, the authority
of state and local governments to engage in land use
planning has been sustained against constitutional
challenge as long ago as our decision in Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303,
47 S. Ct. 114 (1926). "Government hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S.
Ct. 158 (1922). A land use regulation does not effect
a taking if it "substantially advances legitimate state
interests" and does not "deny an owner economically
viable use of his land." Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106, 100 S. Ct. 2138
(1980) .6
The sort of land use regulations discussed in
the cases just cited, however, differ in two relevant
particulars from the present case. First, they
involved essentially legislative determinations
classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the
city made an adjudicative decision to condition
petitioner's application for a building permit on an
individual parcel. Second, the conditions imposed
were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner
might make of her own parcel, but a requirement
that she deed portions of the property to the city. In
Nollan, supra, we held that governmental authority
to exact such a condition was circumscribed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the
well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions, "
the government may not require a person to give up
a constitutional right--here the right to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public
use--in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred
by the government where the property sought has
little or no relationship to the benefit. See Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 92 S.
Ct. 2694 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of
Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 20
L. Ed. 2d 811, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968).
Petitioner contends that the city has forced
her to choose between the building permit and her
right under the Fifth Amendment to just
compensation for the public easements. Petitioner
does not quarrel with the city's authority to exact
some forms of dedication as a condition for the grant
of a building permit, but challenges the showing
made by the city to justify these exactions. She
argues that the city has identified "no special
benefits" conferred on her, and has not identified any
"special quantifiable burdens" created by her new
store that would justify the particular dedications
required from her which are not required from the
public at large.
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nIn evaluating petitioner's claim, we must
first determine whether the "essential nexus" exists
between the "legitimate state interest" and the permit
condition exacted by the city. Nollan, 483 U.S., at
837. If we find that a nexus exists, we must then
decide the required degree of connection between the
exactions and the projected impact of the proposed
development. We were not required to reach this
question in Nollan, because we concluded that the
connection did not meet even the loosest standard.
483 U.S., at 838. Here, however, we must decide
this question.
A
We addressed the essential nexus question in
Nollan. The California Coastal Commission
demanded a lateral public easement across the
Nollan's beachfront lot in exchange for a permit to
demolish an existing bungalow and replace it with a
three-bedroom house. 483 U.S., at 828. The public
easement was designed to connect two public
beaches that were separated by the Nollan's
property. The Coastal Commission had asserted that
the public easement condition was imposed to
promote the legitimate state interest of diminishing
the "blockage of the view of the ocean" caused by
construction of the larger house.
We agreed that the Coastal Commission's
concern with protecting visual access to the ocean
constituted a legitimate public interest. Id., at 835.
We also agreed that the permit condition would have
been constitutional "even if it consisted of the
requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot
on their property for passersby with whose sighting
of the ocean their new house would interfere." Id.,
at 836. We resolved, however, that the Coastal
Commission's regulatory authority was set
completely adrift from its constitutional moorings
when it claimed that a nexus existed between visual
access to the ocean and a permit condition requiring
lateral public access along the Nollan's beachfront
lot. Id., at 837. How enhancing the public's ability
to "traverse to and along the shorefront" served the
same governmental purpose of "visual access to the
ocean" from the roadway was beyond our ability to
countenance. The absence of a nexus left the Coastal
Commission in the position of simply trying to
obtain an easement through gimmickry, which
converted a valid regulation of land use into "an
out-and-out plan of extortion." Ibid., quoting J. E.
D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581,
584, 432 A. 2d 12, 14-15 (1981).
No such gimmicks are associated with the
permit conditions imposed by the city in this case.
Undoubtedly, the prevention of flooding along Fanno
Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the
Central Business District qualify as the type of
legitimate public purposes we have upheld. Agins,
supra, at 260-262. It seems equally obvious that a
nexus exists between preventing flooding along
Fanno Creek and limiting development within the
creek's 100-year floodplain. Petitioner proposes to
double the size of her retail store and to pave her
now-gravel parking lot, thereby expanding the
impervious surface on the property and increasing
the amount of stormwater run-off into Fanno Creek.
The same may be said for the city's attempt
to reduce traffic congestion by providing for
alternative means of transportation. In theory, a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway provides a useful
alternative means of transportation for workers and
shoppers: "Pedestrians and bicyclists occupying
dedicated spaces for walking and/or bicycling . . .
remove potential vehicles from streets, resulting in
an overall improvement in total transportation system
flow." A. Nelson, Public Provision of Pedestrian and
Bicycle Access Ways: Public Policy Rationale and
the Nature of Private Benefits 11, Center for
Planning Development, Georgia Institute of
Technology, Working Paper Series (Jan. 1994). See
also, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914;
(recognizing pedestrian and bicycle facilities as
necessary components of any strategy to reduce
traffic congestion).
B
The second part of our analysis requires us
to determine whether the degree of the exactions
demanded by the city's permit conditions bear the
required relationship to the projected impact of
petitioner's proposed development. Nollan, supra, at
834, quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 57
L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978) ("' [A] use
restriction may constitute a taking if not reasonably
necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
government purpose"'). Here the Oregon Supreme
Court deferred to what it termed the "city's
unchallenged factual findings" supporting the
dedication conditions and found them to be
reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of
petitioner's business. 317 Ore., at 120-121, 854 P.
2d, at 443.
The city required that petitioner dedicate "to
the city as Greenway all portions of the site that fall
within the existing 100-year floodplain [of Fanno
Creek] . . . and all property 15 feet above [the
floodplain] boundary." In addition, the city
demanded that the retail store be designed so as not
to intrude into the greenway area. The city relies on
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the Commission's rather tentative findings that
increased stormwater flow from petitioner's property
"can only add to the public need to manage the
[floodplain] for drainage purposes" to support its
conclusion that the "requirement of dedication of the
floodplain area on the site is related to the
applicant's plan to intensify development on the
site." City of Tigard Planning Commission Final
Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. G37.
The city made the following specific findings
relevant to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway:
"In addition, the proposed expanded use of
this site is anticipated to generate additional
vehicular traffic thereby increasing
congestion on nearby collector and arterial
streets. Creation of a convenient, safe
pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an
alternative means of transportation could
offset some of the traffic demand on these
nearby streets and lessen the increase in
traffic congestion." Id., at 24.
The question for us is whether these findings
are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions
imposed by the city on petitioner's building permit.
Since state courts have been dealing with this
question a good deal longer than we have, we turn to
representative decisions made by them.
In some States, very generalized statements
as to the necessary connection between the required
dedication and the proposed development seem to
suffice. See, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc. v.
Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P. 2d 182
(1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 2d 78,
218 N. E. 2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966). We
think this standard is too lax to adequately protect
petitioner's right to just compensation if her property
is taken for a public purpose.
Other state courts require a very exacting
correspondence, described as the "specific and
uniquely attributable" test. The Supreme Court of
Illinois first developed this test in Pioneer Trust &
Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375,
380, 176 N. E. 2d 799, 802 (1961).' Under this
standard, if the local government cannot demonstrate
that its exaction is directly proportional to the
specifically created need, the exaction becomes "a
veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and
a confiscation of private property behind the defense
of police regulations." Id., at 381, 176 N.E. 2d, at
802. We do not think the Federal Constitution
requires such exacting scrutiny, given the nature of
the interests involved.
A number of state courts have taken an
intermediate position, requiring the municipality to
show a "reasonable relationship" between the
required dedication and the impact of the proposed
development. Typical is the Supreme Court of
Nebraska's opinion in Simpson v. North Platte, 206
Neb. 240, 245, 292 N. W. 2d 297, 301 (1980),
where that court stated:
"The distinction, therefore, which must be
made between an appropriate exercise of the
police power and an improper exercise of
eminent domain is whether the requirement
has some reasonable relationship or nexus to
the use to which the property is being made
or is merely being used as an excuse for
taking property simply because at that
particular moment the landowner is asking
the city for some license or permit."
Thus, the court held that a city may not require a
property owner to dedicate private property for some
future public use as a condition of obtaining a
building permit when such future use is not
"occasioned by the construction sought to be
permitted." Id., at 248, 292 N. W. 2d, at 302.
Some form of the reasonable relationship test
has been adopted in many other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608,
137 N. W. 2d 442 (1965); Collis v. Bloomington,
310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976) (requiring a
showing of a reasonable relationship between the
planned subdivision and the municipality's need for
land); College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.
W. 2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan,
606 P. 2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979) (affirming use of
the reasonable relation test). Despite any semantical
differences, general agreement exists among the
courts "that the dedication should have some
reasonable relationship to the needs created by the
[development]." Ibid. See generally, Morosoff, Take
My Beach Please!: Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission and a Rational--Nexus Constitutional
Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B. U. L.
Rev. 823 (1989); see also Parks v. Watson, 716
F.2d 646, 651-653 (CA9 1983).
We think the "reasonable relationship" test
adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer to
the federal constitutional norm than either of those
previously discussed. But we do not adopt it as such,
partly because the term "reasonable relationship"
seems confusingly similar to the term "rational basis"
which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We think a term such as "rough
proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to be
the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise
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mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.!
JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent relies upon a
law review article for the proposition that the city's
conditional demands for part of petitioner's property
are "a species of business regulation that heretofore
warranted a strong presumption of constitutional
validity." Post, at 7. But simply denominating a
governmental measure as a "business regulation"
does not immunize it from constitutional challenge
on the grounds that it violates a provision of the Bill
of Rights. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978), we
held that a statute authorizing a warrantless search of
business premises in order to detect OSHA violations
violated the Fourth Amendment. See also Air
Pollution Variance Board of Colo. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 40 L. Ed. 2d 607, 94
S. Ct. 2114 (1974); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1982). And
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 65 L. Ed.
2d 341, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980), we held that an
order of the New York Public Service Commission,
designed to cut down the use of electricity because of
a fuel shortage, violated the First Amendment insofar
as it prohibited advertising by a utility company to
promote the use of electricity. We see no reason why
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as
much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be
relegated to the status of a poor relation in these
comparable circumstances. We turn now to analysis
of whether the findings relied upon by the city here,
first with respect to the floodplain easement, and
second with respect to the pedestrian/bicycle path,
satisfied these requirements.
It is axiomatic that increasing the amount of
impervious surface will increase the quantity and rate
of storm-water flow from petitioner's property.
Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 4, p. 4-29. Therefore,
keeping the floodplain open and free from
development would likely confine the pressures on
Fanno Creek created by petitioner's development. In
fact, because petitioner's property lies within the
Central Business District, the Community
Development Code already required that petitioner
leave 15% of it as open space and the undeveloped
floodplain would have nearly satisfied that
requirement. App. to Pet. for Cert. G16-G17. But
the city demanded more--it not only wanted
petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also
wanted petitioner's property along Fanno Creek for
its Greenway system. The city has never said why a
public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was
required in the interest of flood control.
The difference to petitioner, of course, is the
loss of her ability to exclude others. As we have
noted, this right to exclude others is "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S., at 176. It is difficult to see why
recreational visitors trampling along petitioner's
floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the
city's legitimate interest in reducing flooding
problems along Fanno Creek, and the city has not
attempted to make any individualized determination
to support this part of its request.
The city contends that recreational easement
along the Greenway is only ancillary to the city's
chief purpose in controlling flood hazards. It further
asserts that unlike the residential property at issue in
Nollan, petitioner's property is commercial in
character and therefore, her right to exclude others
is compromised. Brief for Respondent 41, quoting
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142, 37 L.
Ed. 2d 513, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973) ("'The
Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy
of the home"'). The city maintains that "there is
nothing to suggest that preventing [petitioner] from
prohibiting [the easements] will unreasonably impair
the value of [her] property as a [retail store]."
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
83, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
Admittedly, petitioner wants to build a
bigger store to attract members of the public to her
property. She also wants, however, to be able to
control the time and manner in which they enter.
The recreational easement on the Greenway is
different in character from the exercise of
state-protected rights of free expression and petition
that we permitted in PruneYard. In PruneYard, we
held that a major private shopping center that
attracted more than 25,000 daily patrons had to
provide access to persons exercising their state
constitutional rights to distribute pamphlets and ask
passersby to sign their petitions. Id., at 85. We
based our decision, in part, on the fact that the
shopping center "may restrict expressive activity by
adopting time, place, and manner regulations that
will minimize any interference with its commercial
functions." Id., at 83. By contrast, the city wants to
impose a permanent recreational easement upon
petitioner's property that borders Fanno Creek.
Petitioner would lose all rights to regulate the time
in which the public entered onto the Greenway,
regardless of any interference it might pose with her
retail store. Her right to exclude would not be
regulated, it would be eviscerated.
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If petitioner's proposed development had
somehow encroached on existing greenway space in
the city, it would have been reasonable to require
petitioner to provide some alternative greenway
space for the public either on her property or
elsewhere. See Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836 ("Although
such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant
of continuous access to the property, would have to
be considered a taking if it were not attached to a
development permit, the Commission's assumed
power to forbid construction of the house in order to
protect the public's view of the beach must surely
include the power to condition construction upon
some concession by the owner, even a concession of
property rights, that serves the same end"). But that
is not the case here. We conclude that the findings
upon which the city relies do not show the required
reasonable relationship between the floodplain
easement and the petitioner's proposed new building.
With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle
pathway, we have no doubt that the city was correct
in finding that the larger retail sales facility proposed
by petitioner will increase traffic on the streets of the
Central Business District. The city estimates that the
proposed development would generate roughly 435
additional trips per day.' Dedications for streets,
sidewalks, and other public ways are generally
reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion
from a proposed property use. But on the record
before us, the city has not met its burden of
demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle
and bicycle trips generated by the petitioner's
development reasonably relate to the city's
requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle
pathway easement. The city simply found that the
creation of the pathway "could offset some of the
traffic demand . . . and lessen the increase in traffic
congestion."o
As Justice Peterson of the Supreme Court of
Oregon explained in his dissenting opinion, however,
"the findings of fact that the bicycle pathway system
'could offset some of the traffic demand' is a far cry
from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will,
or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand."
317 Ore., at 127, 854 P. 2d, at 447 (emphasis in
original). No precise mathematical calculation is
required, but the city must make some effort to
quantify its findings in support of the dedication for
the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the
conclusory statement that it could offset some of the
traffic demand generated.
IV
Cities have long engaged in the
commendable task of land use planning, made
necessary by increasing urbanization particularly in
metropolitan areas such as Portland. The city's goals
of reducing flooding hazards and traffic congestion,
and providing for public greenways, are laudable,
but there are outer limits to how this may be done.
"A strong public desire to improve the public
condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S., at
416.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Oregon is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ENDNOTES TO OPINION
1. CDC § 18.86.040.A.1.b provides: "The development shall
facilitate pedestrian/bicycle circulation if the site is located on
a street with designated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated
greenway/open space/park. Specific items to be addressed
[include]: (i) Provision of efficient, convenient and continuous
pedestrian and bicycle transit circulation systems, linking
developments by requiring dedication and construction of
pedestrian and bikepaths identified in the comprehensive plan.
If direct connections cannot be made, require that funds in the
amount of the construction cost be deposited into an account
for the purpose of constructing paths." (App. to Brief for
Respondent B-33-34).
2. The city's decision includes the following relevant
conditions: "1. The applicant shall dedicate to the City as
Greenway all portions of the site that fall within the existing
100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek] (i.e., all portions of
the property below elevation 150.0) and all property 15 feet
above (to the east of) the 150.0 foot floodplain boundary. The
building shall be designed so as not to intrude into the
greenway area." App. to Pet. for Cert.
3. CDC § 18.134.050 contains the following criteria whereby
the decisionmaking authority can approve, approve with
modifications, or deny a variance request:
"(1)The proposed variance will not be materially
detrimental to the purposes of this title, be in
conflict with the policies of the comprehensive plan,
to any other applicable policies of the Community
Development Code, to any other applicable policies
and standards, and to other properties in the same
zoning district or vicinity;
"(2)There are special circumstances that exist which
are peculiar to the lot size or shape, topography or
other circumstances over which the applicant has no
control, and which are not applicable to other
properties in the same zoning district;
"(3)The use proposed will be the same as permitted
under this title and City standards will be
maintained to the greatest extent possible, while
permitting some economic use of the land;
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"(4)Existing physical and natural systems, such as
but not limited to traffic, drainage, dramatic land
form or parks will not be adversely affected any
more than would occur if the development were
located as specified in the title; and
"(5)The hardship is not self-imposed and the
variance requested is the minimum variance which
would alleviate the hardship." App. to Brief for
Respondent 49-50.
4. The Supreme Court of Oregon did not address the
consequences of petitioner's failure to provide alternative
mitigation measures in her variance application and we take
the case as it comes to us. Accordingly, we do not pass on
the constitutionality of the city's variance provisions.
5. JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent suggests that this case is
actually grounded in "substantive" due process, rather than in
the view that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
But there is no doubt that later cases have held that the
Fourteenth Amendment does make the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment applicable to the States, see Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122, 57 L.
Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107
S. Ct. 3141 (1987). Nor is there any doubt that these cases
have relied upon Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897), to reach that
result. See, e.g., Penn Central, supra, at 122 ("The issue
presented . . . [is] whether the restrictions imposed by New
York City's law upon appellants' exploitation of the Terminal
site effect a 'taking' of appellants' property for a public use
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course
is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 239, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897)").
6. There can be no argument that the permit conditions would
deprive petitioner "economically beneficial use" of her
property as she currently operates a retail store on the lot.
Petitioner assuredly is able to derive some economic use
from her property. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina, 505
U.S. , (1992) (slip op., at 13); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 100 S. Ct. 383
(1979); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646
(1978).
7. The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test has now
been adopted by a minority of other courts. See, e.g., J. E.
D. Associates., Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 585, 432
A. 2d 12, 15 (1981); Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd.
of Twp. of Wayne, 66 N. J. 582, 600-601, 334 A. 2d 30, 40
(1975); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 Ohio App.
2d 171, 176, 270 N. E. 2d 370, 374 (1971); Frank Ansuini,
Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R. I. 63, 69, 264 A. 2d 910, 913
(1970).
8. JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent takes us to task for placing
the burden on the city to justify the required dedication. He
is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally
applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on
the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes
an arbitrary regulation of property rights. See, e.g., Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct.
114 (1926). Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative
decision to condition petitioner's application for a building
permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden
properly rests on the city. See Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836. This
conclusion is not, as he suggests, undermined by our decision
in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 52 L. Ed. 2d
531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977), in which we struck down a
housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit
to members of a single family as violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ordinance at issue
in Moore intruded on choices concerning family living
arrangements, an area in which the usual deference to the
legislature was found to be inappropriate. Id., at 499.
9. The city uses a weekday average trip rate of 53.21 trips
per 1000 square feet. Additional Trips Generated = 53.21 X
(17,600 -9720). App. to Pet. for Cert. G15.
10. In rejecting petitioner's request for a variance from the
pathway dedication condition, the city stated that omitting the
planned section of the pathway across petitioner's property
would conflict with its adopted policy of providing a
continuous pathway system. But the Takings Clause requires
the city to implement its policy by condemnation unless the
required relationship between the petitioner's development
and added traffic is shown.
DISSENT: JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE GINSBURG
join, dissenting.
The record does not tell us the dollar value
of petitioner Florence Dolan's interest in excluding
the public from the greenway adjacent to her
hardware business. The mountain of briefs that the
case has generated nevertheless makes it obvious that
the pecuniary value of her victory is far less
important than the rule of law that this case has been
used to establish. It is unquestionably an important
case.
Certain propositions are not in dispute. The
enlargement of the Tigard unit in Dolan's chain of
hardware stores will have an adverse impact on the
city's legitimate and substantial interests in
controlling drainage in Fanno Creek and minimizing
traffic congestion in Tigard's business district. That
impact is sufficient to justify an outright denial of
her application for approval of the expansion. The
city has nevertheless agreed to grant Dolan's
application if she will comply with two conditions,
each of which admittedly will mitigate the adverse
effects of her proposed development. The disputed
question is whether the city has violated the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
by refusing to allow Dolan's planned construction to
proceed unless those conditions are met.
The Court is correct in concluding that the
city may not attach arbitrary conditions to a building
permit or to a variance even when it can rightfully
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deny the application outright. I also agree that state
court decisions dealing with ordinances that govern
municipal development plans provide useful guidance
in a case of this kind. Yet the Court's description of
the doctrinal underpinnings of its decision, the
phrasing of its fledgling test of "rough
proportionality," and the application of that test to
this case run contrary to the traditional treatment of
these cases and break considerable and unpropitious
new ground.
I
Candidly acknowledging the lack of federal
precedent for its exercise in rulemaking, the Court
purports to find guidance in 12 "representative" state
court decisions. To do so is certainly appropriate.'
The state cases the Court consults, however, either
fail to support or decidedly undermine the Court's
conclusions in key respects.
First, although discussion of the state cases
permeates the Court's analysis of the appropriate test
to apply in this case, the test on which the Court
settles is not naturally derived from those courts'
decisions. The Court recognizes as an initial matter
that the city's conditions satisfy the "essential nexus"
requirement announced in Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677,
107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), because they serve the
legitimate interests in minimizing floods and traffic
congestions. Ante, at 11-12.2 The Court goes on,
however, to erect a new constitutional hurdle in the
path of these conditions. In addition to showing a
rational nexus to a public purpose that would justify
an outright denial of the permit, the city must also
demonstrate "rough proportionality" between the
harm caused by the new land use and the benefit
obtained by the condition. Ante, at 16. The Court
also decides for the first time that the city has the
burden of establishing the constitutionality of its
conditions by making an "individualized
determination" that the condition in question satisfies
the proportionality requirement. See ante, at 15-16.
Not one of the state cases cited by the Court
announces anything akin to a "rough proportionality"
requirement. For the most part, moreover, those
cases that invalidated municipal ordinances did so on
state law or unspecified grounds roughly equivalent
to Nollan's "essential nexus" requirement. See, e.g.,
Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 245-248,
292 N. W. 2d 297, 301-302 (1980) (ordinance
lacking "reasonable relationship" or "rational nexus"
to property's use violated Nebraska constitution); J.
E. D. Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.
H. 581, 583-585, 432 A. 2d 12, 14-15 (1981) (state
constitutional grounds). One case purporting to apply
the strict "specifically and uniquely attributable" test
established by Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v.
Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N. E. 2d 799
(1961), nevertheless found that test was satisfied
because the legislature had decided that the
subdivision at issue created the need for a park or
parks. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone
County, 144 Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P. 2d 182,
187-188 (1964). In only one of the seven cases
upholding a land use regulation did the losing
property owner petition this Court for certiorari. See
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d
608, 137 N. W. 2d 442 (1965), appeal dism'd, 385
U.S. 4 (1966) (want of substantial federal question).
Although 4 of the 12 opinions mention the Federal
Constitution--two of those only in passing--it is quite
obvious that neither the courts nor the litigants
imagined they might be participating in the
development of a new rule of federal law. Thus,
although these state cases do lend support to the
Court's reaffirmance of Nollan's reasonable nexus
requirement, the role the Court accords them in the
announcement of its newly minted second phase of
the constitutional inquiry is remarkably inventive.
In addition, the Court ignores the state
courts' willingness to consider what the property
owner gains from the exchange in question. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for example, found it
significant that the village's approval of a proposed
subdivision plat "enables the subdivider to profit
financially by selling the subdivision lots as
home-building sites and thus realizing a greater price
than could have been obtained if he had sold his
property as unplatted lands." Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 619-620; 137 N.
W. 2d 442, 448 (1965). The required dedication as
a condition of that approval was permissible "in
return for this benefit." Ibid. See also Collis v.
Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 11-13, 246 N. W. 2d
19, 23-24 (1976) (citing Jordan); College Station v.
Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S. W. 2d 802, 806 (Tex.
1984) (dedication requirement only triggered when
developer chooses to develop land). In this case,
moreover, Dolan's acceptance of the permit, with its
attached conditions, would provide her with benefits
that may well go beyond any advantage she gets
from expanding her business. As the United States
pointed out at oral argument, the improvement that
the city's drainage plan contemplates would widen
the channel and reinforce the slopes to increase the
carrying capacity during serious floods, "conferring
considerable benefits on the property owners
immediately adjacent to the creek." Tr. of Oral Arg.
41-42.
The state court decisions also are
enlightening in the extent to which they required that
the entire parcel be given controlling importance. All
but one of the cases involve challenges to provisions
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in municipal ordinances requiring developers to
dedicate either a percentage of the entire parcel
(usually 7 or 10 percent of the platted subdivision) or
an equivalent value in cash (usually a certain dollar
amount per lot) to help finance the construction of
roads, utilities, schools, parks and playgrounds. In
assessing the legality of the conditions, the courts
gave no indication that the transfer of an interest in
realty was any more objectionable than a cash
payment. See, e.g., Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.
Y. 2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966); Jordan, supra; Collis, supra. None of the
decisions identified the surrender of the fee owner's
"power to exclude" as having any special
significance. Instead, the courts uniformly examined
the character of the entire economic transaction.
I
It is not merely state cases, but our own
cases as well, that require the analysis to focus on
the impact of the city's action on the entire parcel of
private property. In Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631,
98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), we stated that takings
jurisprudence "does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated." Id., at 130-131. Instead, this Court
focuses "both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights
in the parcel as a whole." Ibid. Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210, 100 S. Ct. 318
(1979), reaffirmed the nondivisibility principle
outlined in Penn Central, stating that "at least where
an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights,
the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety." Id., at 65-663 As recently as last Term,
we approved the principle again. See Concrete Pipe
& Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. , (1993) (slip op., at 42)
(explaining that "a claimant's parcel of property
[cannot] first be divided into what was taken and
what was left" to demonstrate a compensable taking).
Although limitation of the right to exclude others
undoubtedly constitutes a significant infringement
upon property ownership, Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332,
100 S. Ct. 383 (1979), restrictions on that right do
not alone constitute a taking, and do not do so in any
event unless they "unreasonably impair the value or
use" of the property. Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741, 100
S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
The Court's narrow focus on one strand in
the property owner's bundle of rights is particularly
misguided in a case involving the development of
commercial property. As Professor Johnston has
noted:
"The subdivider is a manufacturer,
processer, and marketer of a product; land
is but one of his raw materials. In
subdivision control disputes, the developer
is not defending hearth and home against the
king's intrusion, but simply attempting to
maximize his profits from the sale of a
finished product. As applied to him,
subdivision control exactions are actually
business regulations. " Johnston,
Constitutionality of Subdivision Control
Exactions: The Quest for A Rationale, 52
Cornell L. Q. 871, 923 (1967).4
The exactions associated with the development of a
retail business are likewise a species of business
regulation that heretofore warranted a strong
presumption of constitutional validity.
In Johnston's view, "if the municipality can
demonstrate that its assessment of financial burdens
against subdividers is rational, impartial, and
conducive to fulfillment of authorized planning
objectives, its action need be invalidated only in
those extreme and presumably rare cases where the
burden of compliance is sufficiently great to deter
the owner from proceeding with his planned
development." Id., at 917. The city of Tigard has
demonstrated that its plan is rational and impartial
and that the conditions at issue are "conducive to
fulfillment of authorized planning objectives." Dolan,
on the other hand, has offered no evidence that her
burden of compliance has any impact at all on the
value or profitability of her planned development.
Following the teaching of the cases on which it
purports to rely, the Court should not isolate the
burden associated with the loss of the power to
exclude from an evaluation of the benefit to be
derived from the permit to enlarge the store and the
parking lot.
The 'Court's assurances that its "rough
proportionality" test leaves ample room for cities to
pursue the "commendable task of land use planning,"
ante, at 20--even twice avowing that "no precise
mathematical calculation is required," ante, at 16,
19--are wanting given the result that test compels
here. Under the Court's approach, a city must not
only "quantify its findings," ante, at 19, and make
"individualized determinations" with respect to the
nature and the extent of the relationship between the
conditions and the impact, ante, at 16, 17, but also
demonstrate "proportionality." The correct inquiry
should instead concentrate on whether the required
nexus is present and venture beyond considerations
of a condition's nature or germaneness only if the
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developer establishes that a concededly germane
condition is so grossly disproportionate to the
proposed development's adverse effects that it
manifests motives other than land use regulation on
the part of the city. 5 The heightened requirement the
Court imposes on cities is even more unjustified
when all the tools needed to resolve the questions
presented by this case can be garnered from our
existing case law.
III
Applying its new standard, the Court finds
two defects in the city's case. First, while the record
would adequately support a requirement that Dolan
maintain the portion of the floodplain on her
property as undeveloped open space, it does not
support the additional requirement that the floodplain
be dedicated to the city. Ante, at 16-18. Second,
while the city adequately established the traffic
increase that the proposed development would
generate, it failed to quantify the offsetting decrease
in automobile traffic that the bike path will produce.
Ante, at 18-19. Even under the Court's new rule,
both defects are, at most, nothing more than
harmless error.
In her objections to the floodplain condition,
Dolan made no effort to demonstrate that the
dedication of that portion of her property would be
any more onerous than a simple prohibition against
any development on that portion of her property.
Given the commercial character of both the existing
and the proposed use of the property as a retail
store, it seems likely that potential customers
"trampling along petitioner's floodplain," ante, at 17,
are more valuable than a useless parcel of vacant
land. Moreover, the duty to pay taxes and the
responsibility for potential tort liability may well
make ownership of the fee interest in useless land a
liability rather than an asset. That may explain why
Dolan never conceded that she could be prevented
from building on the floodplain. The City Attorney
also pointed out that absent a dedication, property
owners would be required to "build on their own
land" and "with their own money" a storage facility
for the water runoff. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31. Dolan
apparently "did have that option," but chose not to
seek it. Id., at 31. If Dolan might have been entitled
to a variance confining the city's condition in a
manner this Court would accept, her failure to seek
that narrower form of relief at any stage of the state
administrative and judicial proceedings clearly should
preclude that relief in this Court now.
The Court's rejection of the bike path
condition amounts to nothing more than a play on
words. Everyone agrees that the bike path "could"
offset some of the increased traffic flow that the
larger store will generate, but the findings do not
unequivocally state that it will do so, or tell us just
how many cyclists will replace motorists. Predictions
on such matters are inherently nothing more than
estimates. Certainly the assumption that there will be
an offsetting benefit here is entirely reasonable and
should suffice whether it amounts to 100 percent, 35
percent, or only 5 percent of the increase in
automobile traffic that would otherwise occur. If the
Court proposes to have the federal judiciary
micromanage state decisions of this kind, it is indeed
extending its welcome mat to a significant new class
of litigants. Although there is no reason to believe
that state courts have failed to rise to the task,
property owners have surely found a new friend
today.
IV
The Court has made a serious error by
abandoning the traditional presumption of
constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of
proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid
comprehensive land use plan. Even more
consequential than its incorrect disposition of this
case, however, is the Court's resurrection of a
species of substantive due process analysis that it
firmly rejected decades ago.'
The Court begins its constitutional analysis
by citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 239, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897),
for the proposition that the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment is "applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment." Ante, at 8. That
opinion, however, contains no mention of either the
Takings Clause or the Fifth Amendment;7 it held
that the protection afforded by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to
matters of substance as well as procedure,' and that
the substance of "the due process of law enjoined by
the Fourteenth Amendment requires compensation to
be made or adequately secured to the owner of
private property taken for public use under the
authority of a State." Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 166
U.S., at 235, 236-241. It applied the same kind of
substantive due process analysis more frequently
identified with a better known case that accorded
similar substantive protection to a baker's liberty
interest in working 60 hours a week and 10 hours a
day. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 49 L.
Ed. 937, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).9
Later cases have interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive protection against
uncompensated deprivations of private property by
the States as though it incorporated the text of the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. See, e.g.,
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis,
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480 U.S. 470, 481, n. 10, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S.
Ct. 1232 (1987). There was nothing problematic
about that interpretation in cases enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment against state action that
involved the actual physical invasion of private
property. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-433, 73 L. Ed. 2d
868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-180, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332,
100 S. Ct. 383 (1979). Justice Holmes charted a
significant new course, however, when he opined
that a state law making it "commercially
impracticable to mine certain coal" had "very nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it." Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414, 67 L. Ed. 322,
43 S. Ct. 158 (1922). The so-called "regulatory
takings" doctrine that the Holmes dictumo kindled
has an obvious kinship with the line of substantive
due process cases that Lochner exemplified. Besides
having similar ancestry, both doctrines are
potentially open-ended sources of judicial power to
invalidate state economic regulations that Members
of this Court view as unwise or unfair.
This case inaugurates an even more recent
judicial innovation than the regulatory takings
doctrine: the application of the "unconstitutional
conditions" label to a mutually beneficial transaction
between a property owner and a city. The Court tells
us that the city's refusal to grant Dolan a
discretionary benefit infringes her right to receive
just compensation for the property interests that she
has refused to dedicate to the city "where the
property sought has little or no relationship to the
benefit."" Although it is well settled that a
government cannot deny a benefit on a basis that
infringes constitutionally protected
interests--"especially [one's] interest in freedom of
speech," Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597,
33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972)--the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine provides an
inadequate framework in which to analyze this
case.12
Dolan has no right to be compensated for a
taking unless the city acquires the property interests
that she has refused to surrender. Since no taking has
yet occurred, there has not been any infringement of
her constitutional right to compensation. See
Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11-17, 108 L. Ed. 2d
1, 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990) (finding takings claim
premature because property owner had not yet
sought compensation under Tucker Act); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 294-295, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct.
2352 (1981) (no taking where no one "identified any
property . . . that has allegedly been taken").
Even if Dolan should accept the city's
conditions in exchange for the benefit that she seeks,
it would not necessarily follow that she had been
denied "just compensation" since it would be
appropriate to consider the receipt of that benefit in
any calculation of "just compensation." See
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) (noting
that an "average reciprocity of advantage" was
deemed to justify many laws); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 715, 95 L. Ed. 2d 668, 107 S. Ct. 2076
(1987) (such "'reciprocity of advantage"' weighed in
favor of a statute's constitutionality). Particularly in
the absence of any evidence on the point, we should
not presume that the discretionary benefit the city
has offered is less valuable than the property
interests that Dolan can retain or surrender at her
option. But even if that discretionary benefit were so
trifling that it could not be considered just
compensation when it has "little or no relationship"
to the property, the Court fails to explain why the
same value would suffice when the required nexus is
present. In this respect, the Court's reliance on the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine is assuredly
novel, and arguably incoherent. The city's conditions
are by no means immune from constitutional
scrutiny. The level of scrutiny, however, does not
approximate the kind of review that would apply if
the city had insisted on a surrender of Dolan's First
Amendment rights in exchange for a building permit.
One can only hope that the Court's reliance today on
First Amendment cases, see ante, at 10 (citing Perry
v. Sindermann, supra, and Pickering v. Board of Ed.
of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568,
20 L. Ed. 2d 811, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968)), and its
candid disavowal of the term "rational basis" to
describe its new standard of review, see ante, at
15-16, do not signify a reassertion of the kind of
superlegislative power the Court exercised during the
Lochner era.
The Court has decided to apply its
heightened scrutiny to a single strand--the power to
exclude--in the bundle of rights that enables a
commercial enterprise to flourish in an urban
environment. That intangible interest is undoubtedly
worthy of constitutional protection-- much like the
grandmother's interest in deciding which of her
relatives may share her home in Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S.
Ct. 1932 (1977). Both interests are protected from
arbitrary state action by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is, however, a curious
irony that Members of the majority in this case
would impose an almost insurmountable burden of
proof on the property owner in the Moore case while
saddling the city with a heightened burden in this
case.1
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In its application of what is essentially the
doctrine of substantive due process, the Court
confuses the past with the present. On November 13,
1922, the village of Euclid, Ohio, adopted a zoning
ordinance that effectively confiscated 75 percent of
the value of property owned by the Ambler Realty
Company. Despite its recognition that such an
ordinance "would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive" at an earlier date, the Court (over the
dissent of Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and
Butler) upheld the ordinance. Today's majority
should heed the words of Justice Sutherland:
"Such regulations are sustained, under the
complex conditions of our day, for reasons
analogous to those which justify traffic
regulations, which, before the advent of
automobiles and rapid transit street railways,
would have been condemned as fatally
arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there
is no inconsistency, for while the meaning
of constitutional guaranties never varies, the
scope of their application must expand or
contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming
within the field of their operation. In a
changing world, it is impossible that it
should be otherwise." Euclid v. Ambler
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47
S. Ct. 114 (1926).
In our changing world one thing is certain:
uncertainty will characterize predictions about the
impact of new urban developments on the risks of
floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or
environmental harms. When there is doubt
concerning the magnitude of those impacts, the
public interest in averting them must outweigh the
private interest of the commercial entrepreneur. If
the government can demonstrate that the conditions
it has imposed in a land-use permit are rational,
impartial and conducive to fulfilling the aims of a
valid land-use plan, a strong presumption of validity
should attach to those conditions. The burden of
demonstrating that those conditions have
unreasonably impaired the economic value of the
proposed improvement belongs squarely on the
shoulders of the party challenging the state action's
constitutionality. That allocation of burdens has
served us well in the past. The Court has stumbled
badly today by reversing it.
I respectfully dissent.
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L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977) (STEVENS, J.,
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7. An earlier case deemed it "well settled" that the Takings
Clause "is a limitation on the power of the Federal
government, and not on the States." Pumpelly v. Green Bay
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9. The Lochner Court refused to presume that there was a
reasonable connection between the regulation and the state
interest in protecting the public health. 198 U.S., at 60-61. A
similar refusal to identify a sufficient nexus between an
enlarged building with a newly paved parking lot and the state
interests in minimizing the risks of flooding and traffic
congestion proves fatal to the city's permit conditions in this
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10. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 484, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987)
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"advisory").
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the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the
government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right-here the right to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use-in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the property sought has little or no
relationship to the benefit." Ibid.
12. Although it has a long history, see Home Ins. Co. v.
Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 20 Wall. 445, 451, 22 L. Ed. 365
(1874), the 'unconstitutional conditions" doctrine has for just
as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application; it
has never been an overarching principle of constitutional law
that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the
rights and powers in question. See, e.g., Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70
B. U. L. Rev. 593, 620 (1990) (doctrine is "too crude and
too general to provide help in contested cases"); Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415, 1416
(1989) (doctrine is "riven with inconsistencies"); Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
Colum. L. Rev. 321, 322 (1935) ("The Supreme Court has
sustained many such exertions of power even after
announcing the broad doctrine that would invalidate them").
As the majority's case citations suggest, ante, at 10, modern
decisions invoking the doctrine have most frequently
involved First Amendment liberties, see also, e.g., Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-144, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708, 103 S.
Ct. 1684 (1983); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361-363, 49
L. Ed. 2d 547, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 83
S. Ct. 1790 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
518-519, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460, 78 S. Ct. 1332 (1958). But see
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-346, 92 L. Ed. 2d 266, 106 S. Ct.
2968 (1986) ("the greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban
advertising of casino gambling"). The necessary and
traditional breadth of municipalities' power to regulate
property development, together with the absence here of
fragile and easily "chilled" constitutional rights such as that
of free speech, make it quite clear that the Court is really
writing on a clean slate rather than merely applying
-well-settled" doctrine. See ante, at 9.
13. The author of today's opinion joined Justice Stewart's
dissent in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 52 L. Ed.
2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977). There the dissenters found it
sufficient, in response to my argument that the zoning
ordinance was an arbitrary regulation of property rights, that
"if the ordinance is a rational attempt to promote 'the city's
interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods,'
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 310, 96 S. Ct. 2440 (opinion of Stevens, J.), it is . .
. a permissible restriction on the use of private property under
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303,
47 S. Ct. 114, and Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 72
L. Ed. 842, 48 S. Ct. 447." Id., at 540, n. 10. The dissent
went on to state that my calling the city to task for failing to
explain the need for enacting the ordinance "placed the
burden on the wrong party." Ibid. (emphasis added).
Recently, two other Members of today's majority severely
criticized the holding in Moore. See United States v. Carlton,
512 U.S. , (1994) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment)
(slip op., at 3-4); see also id., at (SCALIA, J., concurring
in judgment) (slip op., at 1) (calling the doctrine of
substantive due process "an oxymoron").
JUSTICE SOUTER, dissenting.
This case, like Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S.
Ct. 3141 (1987), invites the Court to examine the
relationship between conditions imposed by
development permits, requiring landowners to
dedicate portions of their land for use by the public,
and governmental interests in mitigating the adverse
effects of such development. Nollan declared the
need for a nexus between the nature of an exaction
of an interest in land (a beach easement) and the
nature of governmental interests. The Court treats
this case as raising a further question, not about the
nature, but about the degree, of connection required
between such an exaction and the adverse effects of
development. The Court's opinion announces a test
to address this question, but as I read the opinion,
the Court does not apply that test to these facts,
which do not raise the question the Court addresses.
First, as to the floodplain and Greenway, the
Court acknowledges that an easement of this land for
open space (and presumably including the five feet
required for needed creek channel improvements) is
reasonably related to flood control, see ante, at
11-12, 18, but argues that the "permanent
recreational easement" for the public on the
Greenway is not so related, see ante, at 18-20. If
that is so, it is not because of any lack of
proportionality between permit condition and adverse
effect, but because of a lack of any rational
connection at all between exaction of a public
recreational area and the governmental interest in
providing for the effect of increased water runoff.
That is merely an application of Nollan's nexus
analysis. As the Court notes, "if petitioner's
proposed development had somehow encroached on
existing greenway space in the city, it would have
been reasonable to require petitioner to provide some
alternative greenway space for the public." Ante, at
19. But that, of course, was not the fact, and the city
of Tigard never sought to justify the public access
portion of the dedication as related to flood control.
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It merely argued that whatever recreational uses
were made of the bicycle path and the one foot edge
on either side, were incidental to the permit
condition requiring dedication of the 15-foot
easement for an 8-foot-wide bicycle path and for
flood control, including open space requirements and
relocation of the bank of the river by some five feet.
It seems to me such incidental recreational use can
stand or fall with the bicycle path, which the city
justified by reference to traffic congestion. As to the
relationship the Court examines, between the
recreational easement and a purpose never put forth
as a justification by the city, the Court unsurprisingly
finds a recreation area to be unrelated to flood
control.
Second, as to the bicycle path, the Court
again acknowledges the "theoretically" reasonable
relationship between "the city's attempt to reduce
traffic congestion by providing [a bicycle path] for
alternative means of transportation," ante, at 12, and
the "correct" finding of the city that "the larger retail
sales facility proposed by petitioner will increase
traffic on the streets of the Central Business
District." Ante, at 20. The Court only faults the city
for saying that the bicycle path "could" rather than
"would" offset the increased traffic from the store,
ante, at 20-21. That again, as far as I can tell, is an
application of Nollan, for the Court holds that the
stated connection ("could offset") between traffic
congestion and bicycle paths is too tenuous; only if
the bicycle path "would" offset the increased traffic
by some amount, could the bicycle path be said to be
relatedto the city's legitimate interest in reducing
traffic congestion.
I cannot agree that the application of Nollan
is a sound one here, since it appears that the Court
has placed the burden of producing evidence of
relationship on the city, despite the usual rule in
cases involving the police power that the government
is presumed to have acted constitutionally.' Having
thus assigned the burden, the Court concludes that
the City loses based on one word ("could" instead of
"would"), and despite the fact that this record shows
the connection the Court looks for. Dolan has put
forward no evidence that the burden of granting a
dedication for the bicycle path is unrelated in kind to
the anticipated increase in traffic congestion, nor, if
there exists a requirement that the relationship be
related in degree, has Dolan shown that the exaction
fails any such test. The city, by contrast, calculated
the increased traffic flow that would result from
Dolan's proposed development to be 435 trips per
day, and its Comprehensive Plan, applied here,
relied on studies showing the link between alternative
modes of transportation, including bicycle paths, and
reduced street traffic congestion. See, e.g., Brief for
Respondent A-5, quoting City of Tigard's
Comprehensive Plan ("'Bicycle and pedestrian
pathway systems will result in some reduction of
automobile trips within the community"'). Nollan,
therefore, is satisfied, and on that assumption the
city's conditions should not be held to fail a further
rough proportionality test or any other that might be
devised to give meaning to the constitutional limits.
As Members of this Court have said before, "the
common zoning regulations requiring subdividers to
. . . dedicate certain areas to public streets, are in
accord with our constitutional traditions because the
proposed property use would otherwise be the cause
of excessive congestion." Pennell v. San Jose, 485
U.S. 1, 20, 99 L. Ed. 2d 1, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988)
(SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The bicycle path permit condition is
fundamentally no different from these.
In any event, on my reading, the Court's
conclusions about the city's vulnerability carry the
Court no further than Nollan has gone already, and
I do not view this case as a suitable vehicle for
taking the law beyond that point. The right case for
the enunciation of takings doctrine seems hard to
spot. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. , (1992) (statement of SOUTER, J.).
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LOSING THEIR LAND TO THE GOVERNMENT
Eminent Domain Cases Spark Disputes Over Fair Prices for Property Compensation
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Marianne Kyriakos, Washington Post Staff Writer
In a foursquare frame house in Fairfax,
Robert Smith was born and raised. Now 68, he and
his wife, Joan, raised their own six children in the
same house.
Smith's parents planted three spruce trees on
the eight-acre property in 1927. "Robert's uncle
worked at Woodies," Joan Smith said. "The trees
came out of the Christmas window display at
Woodward and Lothrop's downtown on F Street."
The trees today are lush and stately. But the
Smiths are about to lose their house and their trees
to progress: Jermantown Road is being widened, and
Oakton Road at the corner will be detoured straight
through their house.
Their property is being taken under the
centuries-old doctrine of eminent domain, in which
the state can take an owner's property as long as the
owner is properly compensated.
Each year in the Washington area, there are
dozens of eminent domain cases, mostly involving
road construction projects, each with its own set of
anxieties for the landowners, and often with
conflicting views on just how much money the
landowner ought to get. If no agreement is reached,
the cases end up in court with condemnation juries
visiting the sites, hearing evidence from conflicting
appraisals and then setting the damages.
The Smith family was offered $31,000 an
acre for the land. That's not enough, according to
Smith's son, Kevin, president of Smith Development
Inc. in Arlington. The younger Smith said
developers have paid from $100,000 to $200,000 an
acre for land in the area northwest of the Route 123
and Interstate 66 interchange.
So far, the dealings with the Virginia state
government and Fairfax County have remained on
"very friendly terms." Still, he said, his parents soon
will not have a house.
"My dad is unclear on the power [the
government] has on all the issues," Kevin Smith
said. "He believes he isn't going anywhere, which
isn't necessarily the best thing, but I think he has a
lot of attachment here. They are virtually throwing
my parents out on the streets."
For the Smith's next-door neighbor Fred
Craig, 50, it is the fourth time he and his family
have faced the power of eminent domain. Like the
Smiths, the Craig family has owned land in the
neighborhood for more than a century. Craig's
grandfather once owned the 54 acres of land now
occupied by Oak Marr Park.
Fred Craig said people often ask him why he
doesn't simply move out of Fairfax. "This is home
to me," Craig said. "My parents are here. My
friends are here. When I was a kid, my grandfather
had an old house on Route 123, and we used to go
and sit with him on the front porch. And my
grandfather knew everyone who drove up and down
Route 123. He would look and say, 'There goes
Cousin Charlie! Here comes Aunt Mary!' "
Craig glanced at a steady stream of
stranger-filled cars cruising past the orange-ribboned
stakes on his lawn. "I know progress goes on," he
said. "That's the way things are. But let's deal with
each other fairly."
Joan Morris, spokeswoman for the Virginia
Department of Transportation, acknowledged that
acquiring "right of way," such as land and buildings,
is one of the most difficult aspects of making road
improvements.
"Although we do what we can to make it
easy and painless -- that is, paying the owners a fair
price, helping them relocate, paying moving
expenses -- we realize that there is nothing easy
about leaving your home," she said.
In Northern Virginia, on average, the state
highway department exercises its right of eminent
domain to acquire 10 to 15 homes and businesses a
year. Morris said the largest acquisition in recent
memory occurred several years ago along the Fairfax
Parkway, when the state acquired 24 homes in one
stretch from Rolling Road to Pohick Road.
Liz Kalinowski of the Maryland State
Highway Administration said the state acquires about
106
200 properties of all sizes in the Washington suburbs
each year by power of eminent domain. Kalinowski
found state records from the early 1960s showing
that 185 homes were lost for the Maryland portion of
the Capital Beltway. "Today, 95 percent of acquired
properties have no homes involved," she said.
At present, there are about 120 eminent
domain cases pending in Maryland, some going back
as far as 1988.
In January a Fairfax Circuit Court jury
awarded John McMichael and his business partner $
697,000 when a Fairfax road-widening project took
22 feet from the front of his Springfield industrial
park and a slice along one side as well.
"It gets real complicated," McMichael said.
"Now we have no road exposure. And I may no
longer be able to rent [the facility], because there is
not enough parking left to satisfy the county's green
space and parking requirements."
John J. Delaney, a zoning attorney with
Linowes and Blocher, said the U.S. Supreme Court
is paying increasing attention to property rights
cases.
"One of the key provisions of the Fifth
Amendment says you may not be deprived of life,
liberty or property," Delaney said. "About 40 years
ago, Justice Felix Frankfurter observed that life and
liberty were being accorded more protection in the
courts than property, but that maybe, someday, the
worm would turn. That time may well be coming
now."
Once upon a time, in the early 17th century,
the king and queen of England learned that when
they took private property for public use, it was
polite to pay for it.
It still is legal for state, local and federal
governments to take land -- and any buildings on it
-- without the owner's consent if it's for public use.
But, thanks to that English precedent, the owner is
entitled to just compensation.
"It is not so much the right of the crown to
take the property as it is the right of the property
owner to be paid for it," said A. Hugo Blankingship
Jr., a Fairfax lawyer who represented McMichael in
his case. The attorney and his partner, Paul B.
Terpak, have edited a law practice handbook on the
subject, titled "Eminent Domain -- State and
Federal."
Blankingship said the property owner's right
to be paid "precedes the U.S. Constitution.
"Just compensation is based on fair market
value and damages -- if any -- to the residual
property," he said. "You are entitled to a trial if you
do not feel you were justly compensated, where that
is the issue."
In the 1600s and earlier, English practice
was for Parliament to authorize the taking of
property and either to decide the price tag or to
schedule a court proceeding to establish it. It was
easiest, they found, to ban the landowner from the
proceeding.
The American colonies established judicial
procedures that gave the landowner the right to be
heard.
Terpak said he tells juries, " 'This is a
constitutional question you are deciding.' It makes it
really important," he said. "When an eminent
domain jury is called, it might not be as sexy as a
criminal case, but it's awfully important to whoever
owns the land.
"About two years ago, we had one guy who
lived at the intersection of Lee Highway and Cedar
Lane in Fairfax," Terpak said. "The highway
department took his whole front yard. He was left
with a steep cliff instead of a driveway. So his cars
were stranded in his garage! Truthfully, he had to
get his cars out with a crane."
Terpak said: "Aside from taking away your
life or your liberty, one of the greatest powers of
government is to take away your property against
your will."
O 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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93-1849 HUNKINS v. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Zoning-Loss of property value due to down-
zoning-Due process-Compensation.
Ruling below (Minn CtApp, 508 N.W.2d 542):
Developer's claim that proposed change in zon-
ing caused him to lose financing and constituted
taking of his property without just compensation
was premature, because he never submitted de-
velopment plan to city, never requested variance
or special use permit, and never challenged con-
stitutionality of zoning restrictions; accordingly,
his takings claim was properly dismissed by sum-
mary judgment on ripeness/finality grounds.
Questions presented: (1) When city of Minne-
apolis, Minneapolis Community Development
Agency, and Minnesota Technology Corridor
Corp. had associated together to down-zone area
to benefit their own joint enterprise, did marked
diminution in value of property of Muse Ten
Center on account of down-zoning constitute
compensable taking of private property under
U.S. Constitution? (2) Must political entity in-
form property holder of process necessary to ob-
tain variance when political entity downzones
property?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/26/94, by Paul
Engh, of Minneapolis, Minn., and Lawrence H.
Crosby, of St. Paul, Minn.
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Respondent, The Minneapolis Community Development Agency, Respondent, Minnesota Technology
Corridor Corporation, Respondent.
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DAVIES, Judge
In this inverse condemnation action, Stanley
Hunkins appeals from the district court's grant of
summary judgment to respondents City of
Minneapolis, Minneapolis Community Development
Agency, and Minnesota Technology Corridor
Corporation. The district court found that, because
Hunkins had failed to obtain a final determination
from the City's zoning board, he could not establish
that the zoning regulation would have an economic
impact on his property. The court, therefore, refused
to reach the merits of Hunkins' inverse
condemnation claim. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1983, Hunkins purchased two parcels of
land in the Industry Square Development area of
Minneapolis. He contemplated renovating two
existing buildings into a "business incubator" office
complex where fledgling companies could lease
office space and have access to on-site support
services. Hunkins called his complex the "Muse
Ten."
At the same time, the City commissioned a
task force to recommend plans for a comprehensive,
revitalization project in the Industry Square area, to
be known as the "Technology Corridor." Hunkins'
property occupied a portion of the Technology
Corridor.
The City did not adopt the task force's
recommendation report until February 1985. By that
time, the Muse Ten complex had opened its doors.
A year later, in response to concerns about
protecting the area's development scheme, the City
approved a 12-month building permit moratorium so
that it could study possible rezoning. The City later
extended the moratorium into mid-1987. The City
allowed Hunkins to continue renovation of his
property during the moratorium, however, and even
issued him a building permit.
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Before any rezoning occurred, the City
asked the Minnesota Technology Corridor
Corporation ("MTCC") and Minneapolis Community
Development Agency ("MCDA") to assist in the
development of the Technology Corridor. The
MTCC/MCDA's report emerged in December 1986
and proposed using a single developer and
recommended rezoning the area.
In December 1986, the City adopted zoning
ordinances consistent with the Technology Corridor's
zoning requirements, establishing two distinct zones:
(1) the "T" zone, allowing technology intensive uses
only; and (2) the "TC" zone, allowing commercial
uses supportive of technology intensive uses.
Hunkins' Muse Ten property fell within the "TC"
zone. The City viewed the businesses then operating
in the Muse Ten complex as legal nonconforming
uses and set up a special procedure for owners of
those properties to apply for zoning determinations.
Before the City enacted the zoning
ordinances, Hunkins began experiencing financial
difficulties. In April 1987, a judgment for unpaid
property taxes was entered against Hunkins. Several
months later, Hunkins' lender withdrew its financial
backing. Now he claims the lender withdrew in part
because of the proposed zoning changes. Although
he registered his objections with a variety of city
personnel, Hunkins never requested a variance or
special use permit from the City. Nor did he ever
seek to enjoin the enactment or enforcement of the
ordinances.
In April 1991, the Muse Ten property
forfeited to the state for nonpayment of 1986
property taxes.
ISSUE
May a district court refuse to decide a
property owner's takings claim where the owner has
not sought a final determination regarding application
of the zoning to the property?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from a summary judgment, this
court must determine (1) whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the
district court erred in its application of the law.
Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. & Clinics,
426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. 1988).
At trial, no one disputed that Hunkins had
failed to obtain a final determination as to the effect
of the zoning on his property. In finding that
Hunkins' inaction was fatal to his takings claim, the
district court correctly ruled that Hunkins' claim was
premature. Whether a zoning regulation has gone too
far cannot be measured until the administrative
agency has arrived at a final, definitive position
regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue
to the particular land in question. Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3119, 87
L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985). The United States Supreme
Court has clearly established this finality
requirement, noting that the Court's cases "uniformly
reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and
extent of permitted development before adjudicating
the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to
limit it." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
120 L. Ed. 2d 798, U.S. , ,112 S. C.
2886, 2891 (1992) (quoting MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351, 106 S.
Ct. 2561, 91 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1986)).
This court has also dealt with the finality
requirement. Citing Williamson and MacDonald, this
court found that economic impact and interference
with expectation interests cannot be evaluated until
after a final application of the regulations to the land
in question. Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455
N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn. App. 1990), pet. for rev.
denied (Minn. June 26, 1990).
In addition, a "takings claim is not ripe
when the landowners have not submitted a
development plan." Thompson, 455 N.W.2d at 516
(citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260,
100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1980)).
Moreover, a landowner's takings claim is not ripe
even "where only one plan is rejected and no other
plan is proposed." Id. (citing Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37, 98
S. Ct. 2646, 2665-66, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978)).
Now, six years after the City enacted the
zoning ordinances and two years after the property
forfeited to the state, Hunkins attempts to draw a
causal link between the zoning restrictions and the
demise of his development. He contends that the
City's actions, in conjunction with the MCDA and
the MTCC, constituted a final determination and that
requesting a variance or special use permit would
have been futile. As authority for this defense,
Hunkins cites the Minnesota Supreme Court's
holding that "administrative remedies need not be
pursued if it would be futile to do so." McShane v.
City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Minn.
1980).
But Hunkins' reliance on McShane is
misplaced. There, the supreme court ruled that the
McShanes were not first required to exhaust their
administrative remedies by requesting a variance or
a permit because under their particular
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circumstances, "a variance would neither be adequate
nor appropriate relief." Id. Unlike Hunkins, the
McShanes wanted to sell their property, rather than
to develop it. Id. Therefore, they had no
development plan upon which to base a request for
a variance. * * * Action on a request for a variance
would have to wait until [the McShanes] could sell
their property to a buyer with specific plans for it,
and the marketability of the property would almost
certainly be decreased because of the uncertainty. As
a result, [the McShanes] are affected to their
detriment by the zoning regulations even if a
variance ultimately is granted. Id. The supreme court
also questioned the propriety of a variance for the
McShanes allowing commercial use of the property
upon its sale, noting that a variance "would be
virtually impossible * * * without undermining the
safety goals of the [airport zoning] regulations." Id.
In this case, such considerations do not play
a role. More importantly, as developer of the
property, Hunkins might easily have submitted
development plans upon which the zoning board
could have reached a final determination. But
Hunkins never tested the City's commitment to its
zoning regulations. Although he now contends the
city "knew" the scope of his development plans, the
law is clear that an actual plan must be submitted.
Thompson, 455 N.W.2d at 516; see also McShane,
292 N.W.2d at 256 (zoning board needs "to consider
specific plans"). Moreover, the record reflects that
the City granted a variance to a property owner
operating a liquor store within the Technology
Corridor; it might have done the same for Hunkins
had he submitted a plan showing that his
comtemplated use of the property was compatible
with the City's plan.'
We agree, therefore, with the district court's
holding that merely because plaintiffs feel they have
been ignored and the zoning decision ran adverse to
their stated desires * * * does not mean that seeking
a final determination or a variance [was] futile. We
further note that the purpose of the finality
requirement is to force the decisionmaker to arrive
at "a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an
actual, concrete injury." Williamson, 473 U.S. at
193, 105 S. Ct. at 3120.
DECISION
Judge Jack Davies
November 17, 1993
ENDNOTE
1. The district court noted that where a government acts as an
enterpriser, a compensable taking occurs if the property
owner demonstrates that the government's regulation has
caused a substantial diminution in the property's market
value. Where a government acts as an arbitrator, a
compensable taking occurs only if the government's decision
results in the landowner losing all reasonable use of the
property. Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455 N.W.2d 512,
517 (Minn. App. 1990) (citing McShane v. City of Faribault,
292 N.W.2d 253, 258-59 (Minn. 1980)).
At trial and in this appeal, Hunkins correctly argued that,
under these facts, the City acted in an enterprise capacity.
Hunkins also contended that the City's down-zoning
substantially diminished his property's market value. But
neither of these contentions has any bearing on the district
court's decision.
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93-1915 ALTIMUS v. OREGON
Just compensation-Evidence.
Ruling below (Ore CtApp, 124 Or.App. 61,862 P.2d 109):
Evidence in action to condemn two of property
owners' 13 acres for highway widening that,
should property owners apply for both annexation
by nearby city and zone change to bring property
into compliance with city's comprehensive plan-
both of which were necessary to secure change
from agricultural to light industrial zoning, their
property would be subject to city's policy that
permits, but does not require, city to force proper-
ty owners to dedicate portion of their property to
road improvement projects upon annexation in
return for granting zoning change, was relevant
to issue of just compensation; possibility that city
might not require dedication by property owners
affects only weight of evidence, not its relevancy;
such municipal policy, which ensures that speci-
fied services, such as sewer and water service, are
provided to properties that are annexed and al-
lows city to require zoning change applicants to
absorb some of costs associated with provision of
those services by dedicating land, waiving objec-
tions to future assessments, or paying for costs
associated with other traffic improvements, does
not effect unconstitutional taking.
Question presented: Does admission of evi-
dence in condemnation proceeding that petition-
ers would have been required by local ordinance
to dedicate approximately half of property con-
demned in order to obtain zone change violate
petitioners' constitutional rights to just compensa-
tion, due process, and equal protection under
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/31/94, by
Charles F. Hudson, Robert E. Maloney Jr., Lane
Powell Spears Lubersky, and George W. Mead
Jr., all of Portland, Ore.
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WHAT THIS HIGH COURT DID FOR BUSINESS
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1994, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Tuesday, July 5, 1994, Legal Beat
By Paul M. Barrett, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
Business won some key victories in the
Supreme Court term that ended last week. In the
final days of the 1993-94 session, the justices
decided in favor of property owners battling land-use
regulation in one case, and reversed a large
punitive-damages award against Honda Motor Co. in
another. "That certainly ended things with a bang as
far as we were concerned," says Stephen Bokat of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Attorneys and
accountants, in decisions issued earlier in the term,
saw their liability curtailed in certain kinds of civil
lawsuits.
Of course, there were disappointments for
business, including a big defeat in a California tax
case. But "generally, we had a positive term," Mr.
Bokat says.
In the land-use decision, the conservative
majority ruled 5-4 that government must demonstrate
specific justifications for preconditions of building
permits, such as when a portion of private land has
to be turned over for public use.
Dissenting Justice John Paul Stevens, along
with Justices Harry Blackmun, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and David Souter, noted that "property owners have
found a new friend today" in the majority opinion.
Yes they did, answered Chief Justice
William Rehnquist. He spoke for the winners, citing
the constitutional clause that bars government from
taking property without paying for it. "We see no
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment should be relegated to the status of a
poor relation" of other parts of the Bill of Rights, he
wrote.
As satisfying as the Rehnquist rhetoric may
have been to developers, any celebrations of an
economic-rights renaissance would be premature.
The justices don't neccessarily approach business
issues in a tidy, predictable manner, with
conservatives boosting commercial interests and
liberals leaning toward consumers.
This was illustrated by the Honda decision,
which marked the first time that the court reversed
a punitive-damages award on constitutional grounds.
The justices voted 7-2 to revoke a $5 million
personal-injury award imposed on Honda by an
Oregon state-court jury. Corporate defendants
complained that punitive damages, designed to
punish harmful conduct, are "out of control."
Consumer advocates countered that damage awards
discourage unsafe products.
In the Oregon case, the typically liberal
Justice Stevens wrote for the pro-Honda majority,
concluding that Oregon's refusal to follow legal
custom and allow judicial review of punitive awards
denied Honda's constitutional right to "due process."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, a proponent of state
autonomy, joined the dissent by Clinton appointee
Ruth Ginsburg.
One persistent message in the high court's
recent business decisions is: Take your problems to
Congress. That's essentially what the court told
multinational companies to do when they argued that
California's tax-accounting method reached too
deeply into their pockets. Congress had considered
and decided against barring California's tax policy,
and that settled the matter. The vote was 7-2 for the
state, which dodged a financial hit estimated at
several billion dollars.
In a similar refusal to act as lawmakers, the
court spurned entreaties from female and minority
workers who wanted a 1991 antibias statute to be
applied retroactively. In a political compromise,
Democrats and Republicans hadn't clarified whether
plaintiffs with older claims should benefit. By an 8-1
vote, the Supreme Court said that unless Congress
explicitly says otherwise, basic fairness dictates that
a statute ordinarily shouldn't apply to disputes
arising before the law went into effect.
Congress can't keep up with every economic
development, of course. When business complained
to the court about state barriers to interstate
commerce, the justices were sympathetic.
Garbage-haulers have enjoyed something of
a winning streak in this area. Increasingly a regional
rather than a local business, the trash trade has
clashed repeatedly -- and successfully -- with states
trying to keep out other people's garbage. This term,
the justices addressed the opposite problem:
communities that have invested in expensive
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trash-treatment facilities and therefore want to hoard
their garbage. The court said that by enforcing a
so-called flow-control law, Clarkstown, N.Y.,
deprived out-of-state haulers from access to its
supply of garbage. That amounts to "discrimination
against interstate commerce," the majority said, and
the court struck down the law.
The justices also shielded attorneys,
accountants and other financial advisers from a
common type of investor lawsuit. When a deal goes
sour, or a savings and loan fails, suits typically are
filed not only against officers and directors but also
against their advisers. But in a case that stemmed
from a Colorado bond foul-up, the justices ruled 5-4
that investors may no longer use a potent federal
securities-fraud statute to bring claims alleging that
someone "aided or abetted" financial chicanery.
--- By the Numbers
-- MOST LIKELY ALLIES: On the right, Justices
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia voted together
79% of the time in decisions that weren't unanimous.
On the left, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David
Souter voted together 73% of the time.
-- LEAST AGREEABLE PAIR: Justices Thomas and
Harry Blackmun voted the same way in only 10% of
the divided opinions. The runners-up were Justices
Thomas and John Paul Stevens, who reached the
same result 19% of the time.
-- THE ROOKIE GINSBURG: After Justice Souter,
her next most likely ally was Justice Stevens, with
whom she voted in 69% of the split decisions. She
was least likely to vote with Justice Thomas (44%).
-- SWING MAN: Anthony Kennedy voted with the
majority in 13 of the court's 14 cases decided by a
5-4 vote.
-- DISAPPEARING DOCKET: The court decided 84
cases with written opinions, the fewest in nearly four
decades.
Note: Voting rates are based on justices reaching the
same result, but not necessarily by the same
reasoning.
Reprinted by permission THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL o 1994 Dow Jones & Co., Inc. All
rights reserved.
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SUPREME COURT TO RULE ON SUITS
OVER FREQUENT-FLIER PROGRAMS
Copyright 1994 Predicasts, a Division of Ziff Communications Co.
JR Publishing, Inc
Liability Week
April 11, 1994
The Supreme Court agreed April 5 to decide whether consumers may use
state fraud and contract laws to sue airlines over their frequent-flier programs.
The court agreed to hear American Airlines v. Wolens (93-1286), an appeal
by the airline from a ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court holding that the federal
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 didn't protect American from claims for damages
under state consumer fraud and contract law.
"We find that the claims at issue do not relate to the rates, routes or services
of an airline," the Illinois court said. "A frequent-flier program is not an essential
element to the operation of an airline."
In its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, American cited a 1992 Supreme
Court decision that blocked state attorneys general from suing over allegedly
deceptive air-fare advertising.
Lawyers for American also contend that the state court ruling conflicts with
those of several other courts.
The case arose when a group of frequent fliers sued American after the airline
changed its program in 1988 to reduce the number of seats available and bar use of
the plan on certain dates. Since the Illinois Supreme Court ruling, class-action suits
have been filed in the state challenging other airlines' frequent-flier programs.
LIABILITY WEEK, April 11, 1994, at No. 15, Vol. 9. P.O. Box 6654,
McLean, VA 22106. Reprinted with permission of the publisher. Copyright
1994, JR Publishing, Inc. Copyright 1994 JR Publishing, Inc.
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COURT TO DECIDE WHERE AIR TRAVELERS MAY SUE
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
April 5, 1994, Tuesday, Final Edition
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court yesterday announced it
would decide whether disgruntled air travelers can
seek money damages in state courts when airlines
change the rules for frequent flyer benefits.
A ruling on whether the 1978 Airline
Deregulation Act preempts state complaints on
frequent flyer benefits could affect numerous other
grievances that air passengers have brought to state
courts in recent years, for example, when they have
been involuntarily bumped from crowded planes.
State consumer protection statutes and tort
laws generally offer winning plaintiffs more generous
relief than federal laws, sometimes including punitive
damages. Also, state officials and consumer groups
have argued that the individual states, rather than the
federal Transportation Department, are able to
provide better protection for unwary consumers.
The case, arising from a class action lawsuit
filed on behalf of 4 million frequent-flyer members
against American Airlines, could ultimately
determine the fate of the widely used frequent flyer
programs, which are central to most of the nation's
airlines' overall rates and services.
American Airlines said an Illinois Supreme
Court ruling that allows airline consumers to sue in
state court "threatens the economic stability of the
airline industry and undermines the core federal
policies of the Airline Deregulation Act."
When the Supreme Court examined the
scope of the 1978 deregulation law just two years
ago, it broadly interpreted the law, which preempts
state laws "relating to rates, routes or services" of
airlines.
By a 5 to 3 vote, the court said federal law
barred states from regulating airline advertising to
protect consumers from being misled about discount
air fares and their availability. The court in Morales
v. Trans World Airlines said the regulation of airfare
advertising related to rates under the 1978 act.
The current lawsuit, American Airlines v.
Wolens, was brought by members of American's
frequent flyer club, known as the "AAdvantage
Program." They allege that when American, in 1988,
retroactively modified the rules for members' use of
their frequent flyer miles, the airline reduced the
value of the credits, breached its contracts and
defrauded AAdvantage members. They sued under
an Illinois consumer fraud and deceptive practices
law seeking damages for losses as well as punitive
damages.
Rejecting American Airlines attempts to get
the case dismissed, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled
last year that the frequent flyer claims do not relate
to the rates, routes or services of an airline, which
federal law governs.
"A frequent flyer program is not an essential
element to the operation of an airline, " the state
court held. "Indeed, the airline industry functioned
successfully for decades prior to providing incentives
to its travelers in the form of frequent flyer
programs."
Michael B. Hyman, representing the
aggrieved air travelers, added yesterday that the
airlines should not be shielded from state consumer
protection laws when their "wrongdoing" relates to
a "a marketing program, in which you have to be a
member."
Teresa Hanson, an American Airlines
spokeswoman, predicted yesterday that if its frequent
flyer program was subject to various state laws, the
airlines likely would drop it.
"It would be nearly impossible for the
airlines to offer frequent flyer programs if they have
to satisfy criteria in 50 states," said Hanson, based
in Fort Worth. "The economics wouldn't be there."
a 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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HIGH COURT TO RULE ON BANK ANNUITIES ISSUE
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
June 7, 1994, Tuesday, Late Edition Final
By Linda Greenhouse, Special to The New York Times
The Supreme Court agreed today to resolve
one of the most contentious issues in banking law --
whether federally regulated banks can sell annuities,
an investment usually sold by insurance companies.
The case is an appeal by the Comptroller of
the Currency, Eugene Ludwig, and Nationsbank of
North Carolina that the Comptroller authorized in
1990 to act as a sales agent for a variety of
annuities. In a ruling last year, the Federal appeals
court in New Orleans invalidated, as contrary to
Federal law, a 1985 decision by the Comptroller's
office that selling annuities was appropriate for
national banks as an activity "incidental" to the
business of banking.
Banks' entry into the multibillion-dollar
market for annuities, investmentsthat are attractive to
many customers as alternatives to low-interest
certificates of deposit, has split the Federal courts
and provoked a counterattack from the insurance
industry. A lawsuit by a Houston-based insurance
company, the Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company, resulted in this case.
Adding to the ferment over the issue, New
York State bank regulators have permitted
state-chartered banks to sell annuities in a decision
that was upheld in March by the state's highest
court. About half the banks in New York, including
Chemical Bank, have state charters, while other
leading banks, including Citibank and Chase
Manhattan, are nationally chartered.
The American Bankers Association, the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the New
York Clearing House, representing 11 big
commercial banks, all urged the Supreme Court to
hear the case. The New York Clearing House said in
its brief that the underlying question in the case was
"the extent to which national banks may continue to
respond to the needs of their customers in the rapidly
changing marketplace for financial products."
The economic stakes in the outcome are
considerable. In 1992, the last full year for which
the Comptroller's office has statistics, banks sold
annuities worth $12.2 billion, representing about 20
percent of the national market.
Annuities are similar to individual retirement
accounts, which banks offer, because taxes on the
interest earned can be deferred until the customer
retires. But they are not subject to the $2,000
maximum annual contribution limit on I.R.A.'s.
There are several legal issues in the case,
Nationsbank of North Carolina v. the Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Company, No. 93-1612.
The first is the degree of deference that
Federal courts owe to determinations of
administrative agencies like the Comptroller of the
Currency. The brief filed for the Comptroller by the
Solicitor General, Drew S. Days 3d, argues that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
failed to give proper deference to the agency's
reasonable interpretation of its governing statutes.
'Business of Banking'
Beyond the deference issue, the case
involves two Federal banking laws. One,Section
24(7) of the National Bank Act of 1864, permits
national banks to engage in activities that are
"incidental" to the "business of banking." So one
question in the case is whether the Comptroller
correctly determined that the sale of annuities came
within that grant of authority.
The other question is whether annuities are
forms of insurance, as opposed to a noninsurance
investment product. The issue is important because
of another Federal law, Section 92 of the National
Bank Act of 1916, which permits banks in towns of
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants to sell a range of
insurance products, whether or not they are
incidental to banking. Lower courts have interpreted
that grant of authority to small-town banks as
prohibiting, by implication, other banks from selling
insurance products.
In the Comptroller's view, annuities are not
insurance at all because they lack the main
characteristic of insurance, indemnification against
the risk of loss. Annuities are investment contracts,
the Comptroller ruled in adopting the challenged
policy in 1985.
The appeals court in this case rejected that
conclusion, noting that all 50 states regulate annuities
under their insurance laws and that the Internal
Revenue Code defines insurance companies, in part,
as those that issue annuity contracts. The appeals
court said that like life insurance, annuities were sold
on the basis of actuarial calculations. People buy
annuities, the court said, not to insure against the
risk of dying prematurely but against the possibility
of outliving their resources.
Copyright c 1994 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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93-1612 NATIONSBANK OF NORTH CAROLI-
NA N.A. v. VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE IN-
SURANCE CO.
National bank's sale of annuities-National Bank
Act limits on sale of insurance.
Ruling below (Variable Annuity Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Clarke, CA 5, 998 F.2d 1295, 62 LW
2134):
Neither Section 92 of National Bank Act,
which permits banks located in towns with fewer
than 5,000 inhabitants to act as insurance agents,
nor Section 24(7) of act, which grants national
banks power to engage in incidental activities
necessary to business of banking, may be con-
strued to authorize national banks located in
towns with over 5,000 inhabitants to sell annuity
contracts.
Questions presented: (1) Did Fifth Circuit mis-
apply standard of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837(1984), when it engaged in de novo analysis and
failed to defer to comptroller of currency's rea-
sonable construction of 12 USC 24(7) and his
determination that annuities do not constitute
"insurance" for purposes of 12 USC 92? (2)
Does Section 92, which provides that, "in addi-
tion to" their other powers, national banks locat-
ed in places with 5,000 or fewer inhabitants may
act as agent for "any fire, life, or other insurance
company," impliedly bar national banks in more
populous places from brokering annuities, even
though comptroller has determined that broker-
ing annuities is part of "business of banking" or
"incidental" thereto under Section 24(7)?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/13/94, by Steven
S. Rosenthal, Robert M. Kurucza, Robert G.
Ballen, Leslie J. Cloutier, and Morrison & Foer-
ster, all of Washington, D.C.
93-1286 AMERICAN AIRLINES INC. v.
WOLENS
Airline Deregulation Act-State law claims-
Pre-emption.
Ruling below (Ill SupCt, 147 Ill.2d 367, 168
IlI.Dec. 133, 589 N.E.2d 533, 62 LW 2389):
State law breach of contract and consumer
fraud claims based on airline's retroactive modifi-
cation of frequent flyer program do not relate to
"rates, routes, or services" of air carrier and thus
are not pre-empted by Airline Deregulation Act.
Questions presented: (I) Does express pre-emp-
tion clause of Airline Deregulation Act pre-empt
only those state law claims that relate to "essen-
tial" airline operations? (2) Does scope of pre-
emption under act's Section 1305 depend on form
of relief requested?
Petition for certiorari filed 2/8/94, by Bruce J.
Ennis Jr., Jerold S. Solovy, Marguerite M. Tomp-
kins, Donald B. Verrilli, and Jenner & Block, all
of Washington, D.C.
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DISPOSITION: Appellate court affirmed.
JUDGES: BELANDIC, McMORROW
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the
court:
This cause comes to us on remand from the
United States Supreme Court for further
consideration in light of the decision in Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, inc. (1992), 504 U.S. , 119
L. Ed. 2d 157, 112 S. Ct. 2031.
In 1988, plaintiffs filed a class action in the
circuit court of Cook County on behalf of
participants in American's "AAdvantage" frequent
flyer program. Under the program, American awards
mileage credits to participating frequent flyers who
receive free or discounted flights and other travel
benefits based upon their accumulated mileage
credits. The complaint alleged that American's
retroactive modification of the rules of the
AAdvantage program constituted a breach of contract
with plaintiffs and all others who joined the program
prior to May 1988, and violated the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.
121 1/2, par. 261 et seq.) Plaintiffs sought money
damages and an injunction preventing retroactive
application to mileage credits earned prior to the
changes.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss, finding that section 1305 did not preempt
plaintiffs' claims; however, the trial court granted
American's motion for certification for interlocutory
review pursuant to our Rule 308 (134 Ill. 2d R.
308). The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs'
attempt to enjoin American's application of its new
AAdvantage program rules would constitute an
attempt to regulate the service of an airline and was
therefore preempted. (Wolens v. American Airlines
(1990), 207 Ill. App. 3d 35, 39, 565 N.E.2d 258.)
The court found, however, that plaintiffs' damage
claims were not barred by section 1305 of the
Deregulation Act. Wolens, 207 111. App. 3d at 39.
The appellate court issued a certificate of
importance to permit immediate review by this court
pursuant to our Rule 316 (134 Ill. 2d R. 319). This
court affirmed the conclusion of the appellate court
that plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was
preempted by section 1305(a)(1) of the Deregulation
Act. (Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc. (1992), 147
Ill. 2d 367, 589 N.E.2d 533.) Plaintiffs' claim for
damages for breach of contract and violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act survived, however. Plaintiffs'
claim for money damages had only a tangential
relation to defendant's rates and services; thus, this
court found that the claim was not preempted under
section 1305(a)(1).
Following this court's issuance of its opinion
in Wolens, only American petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The
Court vacated the judgment of this court, and
remanded this cause for further consideration in light
of Morales. (American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens
(1992), U.S. , 121 L. Ed. 2d 6, 113 S. Ct. 32.)
We find this court'sdecision addressing plaintiffs'
claim for injunctive relief is consistent with the
Morales ruling; thus, we do not disturb that portion
of this court's previous opinion. Therefore, the only
issue before this court is whether plaintiffs' claim for
money damages for breach of contract and violation
of the Consumer Fraud Act are preempted by section
1305(a)(1) of the Deregulation Act.
We begin our analysis with a review of the
Morales decision. In Morales, the Supreme Court
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considered whether section 1305(a)(1) preempted the
enforcement of State statutes regulating airline fare
advertising based upon guidelines promulgated by
the National Association of Attorneys General, which
included the Illinois Attorney General.
Section 1305(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
"No State or political subdivision thereof
and no interstate agency or other political
agency of two or more States shall enact or
enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard,
or other provision having the force and
effect of law relating to rates, routes, or
services of any air carrier***."
49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
The Morales court noted that the ordinary
meaning of the phrase "relating to" is a broad one,
that is, "'to stand in some relation; to have bearing
or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into
association with or connection with."' (Morales,
504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed. 2d at 167, 112 S. Ct. at
2037, quotingBlack's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed.
1979).) The Court compared the language in the
Deregulation Act to a similarly worded preemption
provision found in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1988)), which preempts all State laws "'insofar as
they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan."'
(Morales, 504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed.2d at 167, 112
S. Ct. at 2037, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).)
Adopting the same interpretation employed in the
ERISA actions, the Court held that State enforcement
actions having a "connection with or reference to
airline 'rates, routes, or services' are preempted
under [section] 1305(a)(1)." (Emphasis added.)
Morales, 504 U.S. at ,119 L. Ed. 2d at 167-68,
112 S. Ct. at 2037.
While the Court concluded that fare
guidelines are preempted under section 1305(a)(1),
it nonetheless held that, in spite of such a broad
interpretation of the "relates to" language, all State
laws would not be preempted. As stated in Morales:
"In concluding that the * * * fare
advertising guidelines are pre-empted, we do
not * * * set out on a road that leads to
pre-emption of state laws against gambling
and prostitution as applied to airlines. Nor
need we address whether state regulation of
the nonprice aspects of fare advertising (for
example, state laws preventing obscene
depictions) would similarly 'relate to' rates;
the connection would obviously be far more
tenuous. To adapt to this case our language
in Shaw, 'some state actions may affect
[airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner" to have pre-emptive
effect."' Morales,
504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed. 2d at 171-72, 112 S. Ct.
at 2040, quoting Shaw v.Delta Air Lines, Inc.
(1983), 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490,
503 n.21, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2901 n.21.
The Morales Court found the fare guidelines
at issue did not present a borderline question; as
such, the Court expressed no view "'about where it
would be appropriate to draw the line"' as to the
types of actions that would be preempted by section
1305(a)(1). (Morales, 504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed.2d
at 172, 112 S. Ct. at 2040, quoting Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc. (1983), 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21, 77
L. Ed. 2d 490, 503 n.21, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2901
n.21.) Moreover, the Court noted, the decision "does
not give the airlines carte blanche to lie to and to
deceive consumers; the [Department of
Transportation] retains the power to prohibit
advertisements which in its opinion do not further
competitive pricing." (Morales, 504 U.S. at , 119
L.Ed. 2d at 172, 112 S. Ct. at 2040. See also 49
U.S.C. app. § 1381 (1988) (granting the Department
of Transportation authority to investigate unfair trade
practices in the airline industry).
The Morales Court concluded that the
guidelines regarding airline fare advertising were
expressly preempted by section 1305(a)(1). The
Court found that the obligations imposed by the
guidelines would have a significant impact upon the
airlines ability to market their product, and hence a
significant impact upon the fares charged. (Morales,
504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed.2d at 171, 112 S. Ct. at
2040.) Thus, since the guidelines related directly to
airline rates, the Attorneys General were precluded
from enforcing the guidelines against the airlines.
II
Morales instructs that, in order to determine
whether the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract
and violation of the Consumer Fraud Act are
preempted, we must decide whether those claims
have a "'connection with or reference to airline
'rates, routes, or services."' (Morales, 504 U.S. at
,119 L. Ed. 2d at 167-68, 112 S. Ct. at 2037,
quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988).) As noted,
however, the Morales Court expressly stated that
certain State actions may be too tenuously or
remotely related to an airlines' rates, routes, or
services to have a preemptive effect. (Morales, 504
U.S. at , 119 L. Ed. 2d at 172, 112 S. Ct. at
2040.) It appears, therefore,that the Morales Court
intended to leave open the possibility that certain
State law actions that had only a slight connection to
an airlines' rates, routes, or services, would not be
preempted by section 1305(a)(1).
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In their complaint, plaintiffs contend that the
AAdvantage frequent flyer program was developed
as a marketing device for the purpose of encouraging
greater use of airline facilities by the general public
and, more particularly, by frequent travelers. Prior
to May 18, 1988, plaintiffs were entitled to redeem
their AAdvantage award certificates for free air
travel on any available date to applicable destinations
for any available seat in the class of service
provided. After that time, American retroactively
altered the terms of its contract with the AAdvantage
program members by instituting various restrictions
on previously earned AAdvantage credits. Plaintiffs
do not challenge American's right to alter or restrict
aspects of the AAdvantage program prospectively;
however, they contend that American never reserved
the right to make such changes retroactive so as to
diminish the value of previously earned AAdvantage
credits.
Pursuant to Morales, we find that the claims
at issue do not relate to the rates, routes, or services
of an airline. A frequent flyer program is not an
essential element to the operation of an airline.
Indeed, the airline industry functioned successfully
for decades prior to providing incentives to its
travelers in the form of frequent flyer programs. As
noted in Chief Justice Miller's special concurrence to
our previous opinion, plaintiffs' claims do not seek
to "establish the rates airlines must charge, or
determine the routes airlines must fly, or dictate the
services airlines must provide." (Wolens, 147 Ill. 2d
at 377.) Instead, the plaintiffs here seek only money
damages for breach of contract and violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act after American implemented
retroactive changes to the terms of its frequent flyer
program.
When a member earns frequent flyer miles
by flying on American or by doing business with
American affiliates, a contractual relationship is
formed which vests the frequent flyer with the right
to earn specific travel awards. American chose to
retroactively alter the terms of the frequent flyer
program. This action constituted a breach of contract
which entitled plaintiffs to pursue an available
remedy. 12A Ill. L. & Prac. Contracts§ 391 (1983).
Accordingly, we conclude that our previous
holding, that plaintiffs' claims for money damages
was not preempted because it bears only a tangential
relation to airline rates, routes, and services,
comports with the Morales decision. As defined, the
word "tangential" is described as: "touching lightly
or in the most tenuous way: Incidental." (Emphasis
added.) (Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2337 (1986).) In view of our finding that
frequent flyer programs are peripheral to the
operation of an airline, it follows that plaintiff's State
law claims for money damages bear only a
tangential, or tenuous, relation to American's rates,
routes, and services.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that
plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation
of the Consumer Fraud Act are not preemptedby
section 1305(a)(1) of the Deregulation Act. The
claims are excluded by the exception carved out in
Morales for actions only tenuously connected to the
airlines' rates, routes, and services. Therefore, the
judgment of the appellate court affirming the circuit
court's denial of American's motion to dismiss under
section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-615) is affirmed.
Appellate court affirmed.
JUSTICE FREEMAN took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because, in my view,
under the reasoning and holding of the Morales case,
plaintiffs' claims for damages under the Consumer
Fraud Act and for breach of contract are preempted
by section 1305(a)(1) of the Airline Deregulation
Act.
I
In 1987 and 1988, the National Association
of Attorneys General (NAAG) drafted detailed
standards governing the advertising and marketing
practices of the airline industry. The purpose of the
guidelines, according to the NAAG, was to "explain
in detail how existing state laws apply to air fare
advertising and frequent flyer programs." (Morales,
504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed.2d at 173, 112 S. Ct. at
2041 (appendix, NAAG Guidelines, Introduction
(1988).) Notwithstanding objections to the
guidelines, on preemption and policy grounds, by the
Department of Transportation and by the Federal
Trade Commission, seven members of the NAAG
sent memoranda to the airlines stating that the
practice of not disclosing all surcharges in airline
fare advertisements was a violation of the members'
respective State laws on deceptive advertising and
trade practices. Some months later, the Texas
Attorney General's office sent the airlines notice of
its intent to sue under Texas' statute prohibiting
deceptive advertising and trade practices for the
airlines' failure to disclosure all surcharges in their
advertisements. The airlines filed suit in the district
court seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief from any action by Texas in conjunction with
the NAAG guidelines on the basis that section
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1305(a)(1) expressly preempted actions to enforce
State deceptive advertising laws.
As noted by the majority, in analyzing the
language of section 1305 prohibiting the States from
enacting or enforcing "any law relating to the rates,
routes, or services of any air carrier," the Morales
Court imparted a broad definition to the phrase
"relating to." The Morales Court additionally
observed that ERISA's similarly worded preemption
provision (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)) had
repeatedly been recognized as having a "'broad
scope"' and an "'expansive sweep"' and being
"'conspicuous for its breadth.'" (Morales, 504 U.S.
at , 119 L. Ed. 2d at 167, 112 S. Ct. at 2037,
quoting Metropolitan LifeInsurance Co. v.
Massachusetts (1985), 471 U.S. 724, 739, 85 L. Ed.
2d 728, 739-40, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2388-89; Pilot
Life Insurance. Co. v. Dedeaux (1987), 481 U.S.
41, 47, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39, 48, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1553;
FMC Corp. v. Holliday (1990), 498 U.S. 52, 58,
112 L. Ed. 2d 356, 364, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407.) The
Court noted that it has been held that a State law
"'relates to"' an employee benefit plan and is
preempted by ERISA "'if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan."' (Morales, 504 U.S. at
, 119 L. Ed. 2d atl67, 112 S. Ct. at 2037, quoting
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983), 463 U.S. 85,
97, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2900.)
The Morales Court determined that because the
relevant language of section 1305(a)(1) of the
Deregulation Act is identical to the preemption
clause in ERISA, it should be given the same broad
interpretation. The Morales Court thus held that
State enforcement actions having a connection with
or reference to airline rates, routes, or services are
preempted under section 1305(a)(1). Morales,
504 U.S. at ,119 L. Ed. 2d at 167-68, 112 S. Ct.
at 2037.
The Court rejected the argument that its
ruling should be limited to State laws expressly
addressing the airline industry (the position takenby
this court in the original Wolens opinion), reasoning
that such a limitation would create "an utterly
irrational loophole * * * [which] ignores the sweep
of the 'relating to' language." (Morales, 504 U.S. at
, 119 L.Ed. 2d at 169, 112 S. Ct. at 2038.) The
Court noted that it had consistently rejected the same
argument in ERISA cases, having held that "'[a]
state law may "relate to" a benefit plan, and thereby
be pre-empted even if the law is not specifically
designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only
indirect.'" Morales, 504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed. 2d
at 169, 112 S. Ct. at 2038, quotinglngersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendon (1990), 498 U.S. 133, 139, 112
L. Ed. 2d 474, 484, 111 S. Ct. 478, 483.
The Morales Court also rejected a contention
essentially the same as that made by Justice Miller in
his special concurrence to this court's previous
opinion and now adopted by the majority, that
plaintiffs' claims are not preempted because they do
not seek to "'establish the rates airlines must charge,
or determine the routes airlines must fly, or dictate
the services airlines must provide."' (Slip op. at 4,
quoting Wolens, 147 Ill. 2d at 377.) The Morales
Court observed that the argument that section
1305(a)(1) only preempts the States from actually
prescribing rates, routes, or services "simply reads
the words 'relating to' out of the statute. Had the
statute been designed to pre-empt state law in such a
limited fashion, it would have forbidden the States to
'regulate rates, routes, and services."' (Emphasis in
original.) Morales, 504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed. 2d at
168, 112 S. Ct. at 2037.
The Court then examined the NAAG
guidelines on fare advertisingand concluded that they
"quite obviously" related to fares. In addition to
requiring that all restrictions and surcharges be
disclosed clearly and conspicuously, the guidelines
also mandated that an advertised fare be available in
sufficient quantities to meet reasonably foreseeable
demand on every flight on every day in every market
in which the fare is advertised or that the
advertisement prominently state the extent of the
unavailability. The Court found that each guideline
bore a reference to air fares, and that under the
Texas statute "violations of these requirements would
give consumers a cause of action (for at least actual
damages [citation]) for an airline's failure to provide
a particular advertised fare--effectively creating an
enforceable right to that fare when the advertisement
fails to include the mandated explanations and
disclaimers." (Morales, 504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed.
2dat 170, 112 S. Ct. at 2039.) Continuing, the
Morales Court compared the case before it to Pilot
Life Insurance Co., 481 U.S. 41, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39,
107 S. Ct. 1549 which "held that a common-law tort
and contract action seeking damages for the failure
of an employee benefit plan to pay benefits 'related
to' employee benefit plans and was preempted by
ERISA." (Morales, 504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed.2d at
170, 112 S. Ct. at 2039.) Beyond the guidelines'
express reference to fares, the Morales Court found
that the obligations imposed by the guidelines "would
have a significant impact upon the airlines' ability to
market their product, and hence a significant impact
upon the fares they charge." Morales, 504 U.S. at
119 L. Ed. 2d at 171, 112 S. Ct. at 2040.
Although the Morales Court held that the
NAAG guidelines were preempted by section
1305(a)(1), the Court pointed out that the
Department of Transportation retains the power to
prohibit deceptive advertising practices. (Morales,
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5 04 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed. 2d at 172, 112 S. Ct. at
2 0 40.)Under section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act
(49 U.S.C. app. § 1381 (1988)), the Department has
the authority to investigate and determine whether
any air carrier is or has been engaged in unfair or
deceptive practices and to order the air carrier to
cease and desist from such practices.
II
In the instant case, plaintiffs' complaints
consist of two separate claims, one under the
Consumer Fraud Act and one for breach of
contract.Illinois' Consumer Fraud Act makes
unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
including but not limited to the use or employment
of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false
promise, misrepresentation or the concealment,
suppression or omission of any material fact, with
intent that others rely upon the concealment,
suppression or omission of such material fact * * *
in the conduct of any trade or commerce." (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1987, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262.) The Act
authorizes the Attorney General or a State's Attorney
to bring an action to restrain by injunction the unfair
act or practice, and to seek civil penalties against any
person found by the court to have engaged in an
unlawful act or practice. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.
121 1/2, par. 267.) Like the Texas consumer
protection statute sought to be enforced in Morales,
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act also allows
individuals to bring actions for damages for
violations of its provisions. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.
121 1/2, par. 270(a).
Plaintiffs' consumer fraud claims sought an
injunction and both actual and punitive damages. In
their complaints plaintiffs allege that American
solicited the use of its airline by "featuring" its
AAdvantage program in mailings and in the
distribution of promotional materials which contained
a delineation of the mileage credits required to obtain
specific benfits, and that through these materials
American induced persons to join the AAdvantage
program. Plaintiffs further allege that they were
induced by American's solicitations and promises to
believe that by accumulating mileage credits they
would receive correspondingly greater travel
benefits. Plaintiffs allege that American offered these
inducements even though it knew that it would
change the terms of the program and institute
capacity control restrictions which would have the
effect of substantially reducing the value of
accumulated mileage credits, and that American
never advised plaintiffs that it believed it had
reserved the right to retroactively restrict or
otherwise reduce or alter the benefits available under
the program.
When reduced to their simplest terms,
plaintiffs' claims for damages, including punitive
damages, under the Consumer Fraud Act are based
upon allegations of American's deceptive advertising,
promotions, and inducements relating to airline fares
(i.e., payment of travel fares with mileage credits
and upgrades in seating class) and services (i.e., the
quantity of seats and flights and the dates of travel to
various destinations) which would be available to
persons who joined and participated in the
AAdvantage program.
Plaintiffs' allegations virtually mirror the
restrictions regarding the advertising of frequent
flyer benefits and the institution of capacity controls
and other frequent flyer program modifications
without advance notice which were proposed in the
NAAG guidelines on frequent flyer programs.
(Morales, 504 U.S. at , 119 L. Ed. 2d at 173, 112
S. Ct. at 2041 (appendix, NAAG Guidelines).)
Although Morales involved those of the guidelines
relating to advertisements of discounted fares rather
than of frequent flyer program benefits, as in
Morales, plaintiffs in the case at bar seek an
adjudication that American's advertising of and
representations concerning frequent flyer fares and
services constituted unfair and deceptive practices, in
violation of State law. Morales held that actions
seeking to enforce State consumer protection statutes
referring and relating to fares and services are
expressly preempted by section 1305(a)(1). Cf.
Hastalis v. Human Rights Comm'n (1990), 205 Ill.
App. 3d 50, 562 N.E.2d 1272 (plaintiff's
discimination complaint under the Illinois Human
Rights Act related to services of the airline and was
preempted by section 1305(a)(1)).
Applying Morales' expansive and sweeping
interpretation of the phrase "relating to," I believe
that plaintiffs' claims for compensatory and punitive
damages based on allegations of common law breach
of contract are likewise preempted by section
1305(a)(1). Plaintiffs allege that prior to May 1988,
AAdvantage members, numbering approximately
four million persons, were entitled to redeem their
award certificates for free air travelon any available
date to applicable destinations for any available seat
in the class of service provided. Although plaintiffs
maintain that they are not attempting to mandate
enforcement of the pre-May 1988 terms of the
AAdvantage program, in order to prevail on their
breach of contract claims plaintiffs must obtain a
State-court adjudication that American is
contractually obligated to continue to redeem mileage
credits earned prior to May 1988 for the same free
fares and unrestricted seating and flight services
which the AAdvantage program provided up until
that time. Such a finding is necessary whether
plaintiffs seek to enforce the terms and conditions of
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the program or an award of money damages for
American's alleged breach of those contractual
obligations.
I find it significant that the Morales Court
several times cited to the decision in Pilot Life
Insurance Co., 481 U.S. 41, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39, 107
S. Ct. 1549. In that case, the plaintiff brought suit
seeking damages for common law tort and breach of
contract based upon the insurance company's
improper processing of his claim for and failure to
pay disability benefits on the group insurance policy
purchased with matching funds of the employer and
employees. The Court held that the common law
causes of action raised in the plaintiff's complaint
"undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption" under
the "relating to" language in ERISA's preemption
clause. This court reached the same conclusion in
Arnold v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 123 Ill. 2d
67, 525 N.E.2d 59. In Wilcox, the plaintiffs'
employer sold the plant where they worked and the
plant subsequently closed. Plaintiffs filed an action
for breach of contract to recover severance benefits
to which they claimed entitlement under the terms of
their employement contract. The complaint also
alleged that the failure to pay the benefits constituted
a violation of the State statute governing the payment
of wages. The court held that the plaintiff's State-law
causes of action based on breach of contract and
violation of the State wage payment law came within
the broad scope of ERISA's preemption of any and
all laws which relate to an employee benefit plan.
Wilcox, 123 I. 2d at 72-73
Morales makes clear that the "relating to"
language in section 1305(a)(1) is as expansive in its
scope as the identical language in ERISA. Several
decisions rendered after Morales have applied that
broad interpretation in cases against airlines. In
Statland v. American Airlines, 998 F.2d 539 (7th
Cir., 1993), plaintiff bought a ticket which carried a
10% cancellation penalty. When she -cancelled the
ticket, American retained 10% of the tax she paid in
addition to 10% of the ticket price. Plaintiff filed a
class action suit that included four State-law claims
alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the
Consumer Fraud Act, conversion and breach of
contract, based upon the airline's alleged wrongful
retention of 10% of the tax she paid. The court
found it "obvious [that] canceled ticket refunds relate
to rates" (Statland, slip op. at 5), and that under
Morales, plaintiffs State statutory and common law
claims were preempted by section 1305(a)(1).
In Schaeffer v. Delta Air lines, Inc. (S.D.
Cal. September 18, 1992), No. 92-1190-E(LSP), the
plaintiffs complaint alleged consumer fraud and
breach of contract for the airline's failure to disclose
in mailings to and oral communications with frequent
flyer program members an increase in mileage
requirements necessary to obtain a free flight. The
complaint was found to be legally and factually
deficient. The court stated, however, that even if the
pleading deficiences could be corrected by
amendment, the action could not be sustained under
the broad definition ascribed to the phrase "relates
to" in Morales. The court found that the allegations
related to both the advertisements and services of an
airlines, and thus were preempted under section
1305(a)(1).
In Vail v. Pan Am Corp. (1992), 260 N.J.
Super. 292, 616 A.2d 523, plaintiffs brought an
action alleging fraud, consumer fraud, and breach of
contract, charging that the airline falsely advertised
that it was initiatingan enhanced security program
and charged $ 5 per ticket to defray the costs of the
program when, in fact, the airline did not provide
any such program. The complaint sought, inter alia,
a refund of the $ 5 surcharge. Plaintiff argued that
her claims were merely traditional actions for fraud
and breach of contract which could have only a
remote effect upon the rates and services of the
airline. The Vail court found the broad interpretation
given to section 1305(a)(1) by Morales was
dispositive of plaintiffs claims, reasoning that if
plaintiff's action were allowed, the State would be
permitted to determine whether an airline's
advertising was false and deceptive and whether the
services advertised were in fact provided, and to
fashion remedies, including proscribing certain
advertising and compelling the airline to repay the
surcharge portion of the rate charged. The court
determined that plaintiffs claims related to the
services and rates of the airline and were, therefore,
preempted under section 1305(a)(1). See also
Cannava v. USAIR, Inc. (D. Mass. January 7,
1993), No. 91-3003-F (passenger's claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, violations
of State unfair practices statute and breach of an
implied contractual obligation to provide courteous
service were preempted under the interpretation
ascribed to section 1305(a)(1) in Morales).
I do not agree with the majority that
plaintiffs' claims bear only a tangential, tenuous, or
remote relation to American's rates, routes, and
services because they do not seek to establish rates,
determine routes or dictate the services American
must provide. Plaintiffs' actions seek a State-court
determination that American violated the Consumer
Fraud Act through deceptive and unfair advertising
and promotion of the AAdvantage program.
Plaintiffs actions also seek a State-court adjudication
that American has a contractual obligation to
provide, and plaintiffs have an enforceable right to
receive, either certain specific fares, flights and seats
in exchange for earned mileage credits, or monetary
124
compensation in lieu thereof. Under the rationale of
Morales and its progeny, plaintiffs claims have a
connection with and relation to American's rates and
services, and are preempted by section 1305(a)(1) of
the Deregulation Act.
I further dissent from the majority's
statement that American's alteration of the terms of
AAdvantage program "constituted a breach of
contract which entitled plaintiffs to pursue an
available remedy." (Slip op. at 4.) This case is
before us on the denial of American's motion to
dismiss. Thus, I believe that it is both premature and
inappropriate to reach or address the merits of
plaintiffs' claims.
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